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There is void in the literature at the intersection of antitrust law and
legacy business practices. This issue has come to forefront with Epic
Games’ antitrust suit against Apple for its App Store policies, which have
been in place ever since the online marketplace opened in 2008. The same
1. Associate Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University.
I thank Tun-Jen Chiang, Eric Claeys, James Cooper, Ken Heyer, Bruce Kobayashi, Robert
Leider, Jennifer Mascott, Derek Moore, Adam Mossoff, Joshua Wright, and participants in
the Scalia Law Levy Workshop and Junior Faculty Workshop for valuable comments and
suggestions. I thank Kevin Wang for excellent research assistance and am also grateful to the
editors of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law for their careful and
considered work on this Article’s manuscript.

244

2021]

THE LEGALITY OF LEGACY

245

issues are at the center of the current Apple v. Pepper litigation and in
regulatory proposals to alter Apple’s business practices both at the state and
federal levels. Legacy conduct has also played a role in the Supreme Court’s
controversial Ohio v. American Express decision and the Ninth Circuit’s
FTC v. Qualcomm decision.
This raises a question as to how antitrust should treat long-standing
business practices⎯practices that this Article labels “legacy
conduct”⎯that initially were benign or even procompetitive, but which
come under heavy scrutiny once the firm employing it obtains considerable
market power. The fundamental question raised here is whether the fact that
a product has become highly successful turns a previously legitimate
business practice into one that antitrust should treat as objectionable.
This Article contends that three fundamental considerations should
govern the proper assessment of cases involving legacy conduct under a rule
of reason analysis. Further, this Article advances a policy recommendation
that legacy conduct instituted long before a firm achieves substantial market
power (particularly at the time of entry) and is common across competitors
who do not themselves possess substantial market power, should be
considered probative evidence that the practice is procompetitive. When
these conditions are satisfied, defendants should be afforded a substantially
reduced burden in proving the restraint is procompetitive under a rule of
reason analysis commensurate with the strength of the legacy evidence.

INTRODUCTION
On June 8, 2015, Epic Games unveiled a live demo of Fortnite, its
popular massive-multiplayer online game, onstage at Apple’s Worldwide
Developers Conference (WWDC) to illustrate the power of the Mac desktop
operating system and graphics processing.2 On April 2, 2018, Epic and
Apple extended their relationship and began to distribute Fortnite on Apple’s
mobile operating system (iOS) through Apple’s App Store.3 The partnership
2. Rob Lefebvre, Everything You Need to Know from WWDC 2015, CULT OF MAC, (June
8, 2015), https://www.cultofmac.com/325350/everything-you-need-to-know-from-wwdc-20
15/ [https://perma.cc/V4JM-PV7X]. See also Benjamin Hiors, Apple WWDC Keynote 2015:
The Highlights, CREATIVEPOOL, (June 9, 2015), https://creativepool.com/magazine/leaders/a
pple-wwdc-keynote-2015-the-highlights.5022 [https://perma.cc/5K9Q-CCLY] (“Speaking of
games, Apple also brought in ‘Gears of War’ and Fortnite developer Epic Games to showcase
what Metal can do in El Capitan.”).
3. Cody Lee, Fortnite Now Available on iOS for Everyone, IDOWNLOADBLOG.COM,
(Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.idownloadblog.com/2018/04/02/fortnite-available-to-everyone/
[https://perma.cc/Q5VA-8LFN].
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on iOS was an immediate, and continuing, success.4
Yet, on August 13, 2020, roughly two years after Fortnite first appeared
on the iPhone, Epic Games filed a private antitrust suit in the Northern
District of California against Apple.5 Epic alleges that Apple’s App Store
policies violate U.S. antitrust laws through the use of a series of restraints of
trade and monopolistic practices.6 Specifically, Epic contends that Apple
uses control over the iOS mobile operating system to protect its App Store
monopoly, which affords Apple exclusive access to iPhone users.7 The
alleged harm from these practices is a reduction in the welfare of consumers
through higher prices and less app store variety; a reduction in the welfare of
developers, who receive a lower return on their proprietary software; and a
reduction in the overall level of innovation in app development and payment
processing services.8 These same issues are also in play in the current In re
Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation case,9 where the Supreme Court has ruled
that iPhone users have standing to sue Apple for its App Store policies, and
the case has been remanded to the lower courts.10 Further, regulatory
proposals to fundamentally alter how Apple governs its App Store have been
made at both the federal and state levels.11

4. See, e.g., Jay Casteel, “Fortnite” Finally Available to All iOS Users, Made $1.8M So
Far, BALLERSTATUS, (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.ballerstatus.com/2018/04/06/fortnitefinally-available-to-all-ios-users-made-1-8m-so-far/ [https://perma.cc/7Q8L-QLBV] (“Now
available to the general public, the official Fortnite iOS app is a smash hit, sitting at No. 1 on
Apple’s App Store, ahead of Instagram and Facebook, as of press time.”). See also Pl.’s
Notice of Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. and Mem. of Points and Authorities in Supp. Thereof at 28,
Epic Games v. Apple, Case No. 4:20-CV-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal., Sep. 4, 2020) (“Over 116
million registered users have accessed Fortnite through iOS—more than any other
platform.”).
5. Compl. for Inj. Relief, Epic Games v. Apple, Case 3:20-cv-05640 (N.D. Cal., Aug.
13, 2020) [hereinafter the Epic Complaint].
6. Id. at ¶ 3.
7. Id.
8. The stated goal of Epic’s lawsuit is injunctive, rather than monetary, relief, so that
app developers can bypass both the App Store and Apple’s payment processing system. See
Epic Complaint, supra note 5, at ¶ 6.
9. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation, Docket No. 4:11-cv-06714 (N.D. Cal. Dec
29, 2011).
10. Apple v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2019) (holding that iPhone users were direct
purchasers under the Court’s prior precedent in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois).
11. See MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ANTITRUST, COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
16 (2020) [hereinafter the Majority Staff House Report] (“Apple leverages its control of iOS
and the App Store to create and enforce barriers to competition and discriminate against and
exclude rivals while preferencing its own offerings.”). See also Proposed House of
Representatives Amendments to H.B. 2005, 55th Leg., 1st reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021) https://www
.azleg.gov/legtext/55leg/1R/proposed/H.2005COBB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3CAA-E35W]
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This case has brought to the forefront an understudied “gray area” in
antitrust. An area of uncertainty due not so much to the fact-intensive nature
of such cases, but due to uncertainty in the state of the law itself.12
Specifically, the Epic complaint raises the following question: What role
does, and should, legacy play in determining antitrust liability? If a practice
has been in place since a product’s entry, or before a product obtained
substantial market power, when does that practice become anticompetitive
as the firm’s market power increases? What are the considerations that help
make this determination?
Apple’s introduction of the App Store on July 10, 2008,13 involved, by
all accounts, an innovative and closely controlled delivery of first-party and
third-party software for mobile devices.14 While perhaps hard to believe
today, before its release, there were calls for Apple to “pull the plug” on the
iPhone as the mobile phone market was then dominated by Nokia and
Motorola.15 In 2008, Apple’s market share in the U.S. for mobile operating
(proposing the ability for app developers to pick their own payment processor and bypass
Apple’s commission on all transactions).
12. See Philip Elman, Antitrust Enforcement: Retrospect and Prospect, 53 AM. BAR
ASSOC. J. 609, 609 (1967) (“[T]he vast and largely unexplored middle of the antitrust
spectrum, however, lie the difficult and complex gray problem areas.”).
13. See, e.g., Jason Snell & Peter Cohen, Apple Opens iTunes App Store, MACWORLD
(July 10, 2008), https://www.macworld.com/article/1134380/app_store.html/ [https://perma.
cc/HT7P-KLG8] (“At launch the App Store included 552 apps, including 135 free
programs.”).
14. See Seth Weintraub, Apple’s Biggest Innovation for 2008? The iPhone App Store,
COMPUTERWORLD, (Aug. 7, 2008), https://www.computerworld.com/article/2478691/apples-biggest-innovation-for-2008---the-iphone-app-store.html/ [https://perma.cc/7C73-B5NS]
(commenting on the most important Apple innovation that year:
I know 2008 is far from over and we have many more Apple products to look
forward to. It just seems to me that Apple has already profoundly changed the
technology landscape again, and people are starting to realize it. In a few years
time when we are drawing up the yearly Apple timeline, 2008 will be known for
one thing . . . the game changer isn’t some shiny, sleek hardware or innovative
new ways of making an operating system hum, it is the way that Apple’s thirdparty developer environment has been set up. The iPhone App store simply makes
the old way of distributing software seem primitive.)
15. E.g., John C. Dvorak, Apple Should Pull the Plug on the iPhone, MARKETWATCH:
JOHN DVORAK’S SECOND OPINION, (Mar. 28, 2007), https://www.marketwatch.com
/story/apple-should-pull-the-plug-on-the-iphone/ [https://perma.cc/42NJ-TBEM] (“[T]he
mobile handset business . . . is not an emerging business. In fact it’s gone so far that it’s in the
process of consolidation with probably two players dominating everything, Nokia Corp. . . .
and Motorola Inc.”). Cf., Ben Thompson, Apple, Epic, and the App Store, STRATECHERY,
(Aug. 17, 2020), https://stratechery.com/2020/apple-epic-and-the-app-store/ [https://perma.
cc/ZX5W-ZT7Y] (noting that:
[I]n 2013, the media was filled with predictions of the iPhone’s imminent demise
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systems was approximately fifteen percent.16 Today, Apple’s U.S. share
stands at forty five percent.17 Since its inception, distribution through the
App Store involved a transaction fee of thirty percent for paid apps, which,
with a few notable exceptions, has remained the same since.18 While the
history of a firm’s challenged practice is something that courts routinely
examine when determining liability,19 there is a void in the literature on how
to systematically assess legacy conduct, that is, practices that have been in
place well before a firm obtained substantial market power. Relevant to this
inquiry, and an issue that is discussed in some detail below, is whether the
firm’s use of the practice in question has been an important contributor to
the firm’s success over time. Has the practice helped legitimately drive
market success and consumer benefits, or does it constitute an artificial
barrier to competition whose primary consequence is to harm consumers and
the competitive process?
The goal of this Article is twofold. The first is to offer a three-factor
assessment to govern the assessment of legacy conduct. The intent is to

at the hands of Android: there were simply too many other manufacturers making
too many smartphones at too many price points that Apple could not or would
not match, which would inevitably lead to developers fleeing iOS and Apple
fighting for its life.
16. iClarified, The History of the Smartphone Market From 2005-2012 [Chart],
(Mar. 21, 2013), https://www.iclarified.com/28457/the-history-of-the-smartphon
e-market-from-20052012-chart/ [https://perma.cc/V7Y4-X724].
17. S. O’Dea, iPhone users as share of smartphone users in the United States 2014-2021,
STATISTA (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/236550/percentage-of-us-popu
lation-that-own-a-iphone-smartphone/ [https://perma.cc/H8UM-TYET].
18. See Def. Apple’s Opp’n to Epic Games Mot. for T.R.O. and Order to Show Cause
Why a Prelim. Inj. Should Not Issue at 4, Epic v. Apple, Case No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 21, 2020) (“[I]n 2016, Apple lowered its commission from 30% to 15% on
subscriptions that renew after the first year.”). Recently, however, Apple has reduced the fee
to 15 percent for developers that earn less than $1 million annually. See, e.g., Tim Higgins &
Sarah E. Needleman, Apple Slashes App Store Fees for Smaller Developers, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 18, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-under-antitrust-scrutiny-halves-app-store
-fee-for-smaller-developers-11605697203/ [https://perma.cc/R6DU-J9JF].
19. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“The history
of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts . . . because knowledge of intent
may help the court to interpret facts and predict consequences.”). See also Kimble v. Marvel
Entertainment, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2408 (2015)
ICLARIFIED

Used in antitrust law, the rule of reason requires courts to evaluate a practice’s
effect on competition by ‘taking into account a variety of factors, including
specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the
[practice] was imposed, and the [practice’s] history, nature, and effect.’ State Oil
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10, 118 S. Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997).
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establish a reliable, and systematic, heuristic to guide agencies and courts
and to contend that legacy evidence, when applicable, should be an integral
part of antitrust fact finding. The second is to assert that legacy conduct
instituted long before a firm achieved substantial market power (particularly
at the time of entry), which is common across competitors within a relevant
market,20 should be taken as evidence that the practice is highly likely to be
procompetitive.
Consequently, defendants should be afforded a
substantially reduced burden in proving the restraint is procompetitive under
a rule of reason analysis commensurate with the strength of the legacy
evidence.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides background on the
rule of reason framework and the role of presumptions in administering
antitrust cases—focused primarily on the Sherman Act.21 Presumptions aid
courts in navigating the often difficult task of weighing the potential
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects from various business practices.
The discussion will tee up how an analysis of legacy business practices fit
into the larger rule of reason framework.
Part II proposes and develops a justification for applying a three-factor
assessment to evaluate legacy conduct. The first factor determines whether
a practice was instituted before substantial market power was achieved, and,
if so, how long before. The second factor considers the commonness of a
practice within a relevant market. Do competitors across the market power
spectrum engage in the same, or similar, practices? If so, when did the other
competitors adopt the practice? What level of market power do those
competitors have, or did have, when they adopted the practice? The third
factor examines whether there is credible evidence that market conditions
have changed to the degree that the prior procompetitive justification no
longer obtains (or is, at the very least, significantly weaker). Taken together,
these factors offer courts a framework to determine how much weight to
afford a firm’s procompetitive justification for a particular restraint.

20. Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 293-294 (1962); See United States v. E.
I. Dupont, 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956) (explaining a “relevant market” is a specific legal and
economic construct designed to delineate the competitive boundaries of a playing field, so
courts can assess the competitive effects of a disputed practice); See generally Jonathan B.
Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129 (2007) (providing
a review of various economic approaches to delineate relevant markets).
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (“Every contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony. . . .”).
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Part III considers when there are sufficient elements to establish a
marginal presumption that a given practice is likely to be procompetitive.22
In practice, this proposal would not disturb the three-step rule of reason
framework.23 Rather, it would impact the degree and quality of proof
required at each step—particularly at the stage where defendants offer a
procompetitive justification.24 Legacy should be considered a fact in favor
of defendants, which ought to be afforded weight in proportion with the
strength of the legacy evidence. Courts routinely establish presumptions in
order to operationalize the rule of reason framework and economize on a
cost-benefit assessment of a restraint—as the goal is to determine whether
the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve greater output, lower costs,
enhanced quality, and greater innovation.25
Part III also discusses a key caveat and a moral hazard concern
regarding this proposal. The caveat is that courts should only consider the
commonness of a practice when it is within a relevant market, that is, intra22. See Steven C. Salop, An Enquiry Meet for the Case: Decision Theory, Presumptions,
and Evidentiary Burdens in Formulating Antitrust Legal Standards, (SSRN, Working Paper
Nov. 6, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3068157/ [https://perma
.cc/4UR4-69KL] at 45 (stating that within the rule of reason framework, a “marginally
procompetitive presumption would place only a marginal ‘thumb on the scale.’”).
23. See Ohio v. Amex, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (“To determine whether a restraint
violates the rule of reason, the parties agree that a three-step, burden-shifting framework
applies.”). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA L. REV. 81, 103–04
(2018). See infra Section I.A. for a detailed discussion of the administration of the rule of
reason framework.
24. See Cal. Dental Ass’n. v. Federal Trade Com’n, 119 S. Ct. 1604, 1617 (1999)
(quoting Professor Phillip Areeda’s insight that ‘‘‘[t]here is always something of a sliding
scale in appraising reasonableness. . . .’”). See also PHILLIP AREEDA, AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTIRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 302 (1978) (“The law might vary the necessary
proofs . . . according to the sanctions at issue and according to the relationship of the
defendant’s power to his conduct.”). Cf., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule
of Reason: A New Standard for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753, 1771
(1994) (explaining that:
[T]o determine the substantive economic effect of defendants’ conduct . . . the
courts will have to undertake varying degrees of inquiry depending upon the type
of restraint at issue. The legality of certain restraints will be easy to determine
because their competitive effects are obvious. Other restrictions will require a
more detailed analysis because their competitive impact is more ambiguous.
25. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 9 (1984) (“The
judge should employ some presumptions and filters that will help to separate pro- and anticompetitive explanations.”); JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM 74 (2019)
(“Many of the rules that courts have developed for deciding antitrust cases can be interpreted
as presumptions.”). See also Lindsey M. Edwards & Joshua D. Wright, The Death of Antitrust
Safe Harbors: Causes and Consequences, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1205 (2016) (describing
how presumptions can evolve over time including the rise and fall of antitrust safe harbors).
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market commonness—not whether it is also common across other industries
or markets, that is, inter-market commonness. This is not to suggest intermarket commonness is irrelevant for the decision-maker or for antitrust
policy more generally—far from it—but, as far as implementing a
presumption founded on legacy considerations in a particular case, it should
be based on intra-market practices. The basic rationale is that inter-market
use of a practice is more likely to violate the ceteris paribus assumption and
have confounding factors that make the information value noisier.
The moral hazard concern is that having a marginally procompetitive
presumption could incentivize firms to stick with a legacy practice—even if
it would be welfare-enhancing to deviate from it—lest the firms lose the
benefit of reducing the burden of production to demonstrate efficiencies. In
other words, can such a presumption inefficiently disincentivize innovative
or evolutionary business practices? While a legitimate concern, ultimately,
the disincentive effects are likely to be minimal because the alternative is
that the practice is considered under a full rule of reason. Thus, if a practice
is truly welfare-enhancing, then the firm will have ample opportunity to
demonstrate that in court.
Finally, Part IV evaluates recent cases that involved issues of legacy
conduct. The first case is Ohio v. American Express, where the Supreme
Court ruled that American Express’ (“Amex”) anti-steering provision was
not an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.26 The Court began its assessment by noting that Amex had its antisteering provision in place since the 1950s.27 The second case is Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) v. Qualcomm, where the FTC alleged that
Qualcomm engaged in anticompetitive licensing practices regarding its
modem chipsets and standard essential patents (SEPs).28 While the case
involves a fairly intricate theory of harm, a central element of Qualcomm’s
defense was that it had engaged in the same licensing practice for three
decades—namely charging an ad valorum royalty rate (an amount based on
the value of the product) on the final price of the mobile phone.29 The third
case is Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System, which involves
26. 138 S. Ct. at 2274 (2018). Anti-steering provisions prevent merchants from
incentivizing cardholders to switch to a different credit card at the point-of-sale (namely, to a
card that the merchant pays a lower transaction, or “swipe,” fee).
27. Id. at 2283 (“Amex has prohibited steering since the 1950s by placing antisteering
provisions in its contracts with merchants.”).
28. 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020).
29. Opening Brief for Appellant Qualcomm at 27, F.T.C. v. Qualcomm, 969 F.3d 974
(9th Cir. Aug. 23, 2019) (No. 19-16122) (“Qualcomm has not changed its practices. It has
always recovered the value of its intellectual property through OEM licensing, while (as a
result) its chip rivals have had only non-exhaustive access to its SEPs.”).
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a “compromised” legacy.30 The case is best known for the Supreme Court’s
ruling that collective, “blanket” music licenses for the copyrighted works of
member artists is not a per se illegal price fixing scheme.31 It is perhaps less
well known that the formation of these music licensing collectives in the
early 20th century was almost immediately challenged by the Department of
Justice (DOJ) as anticompetitive.32 This led to a series of consent decrees
designed to minimize the potentially harmful effects of these collectives,
while preserving the potential benefits from economizing on transaction
costs.33 When the Court assessed the antitrust claims of the plaintiff,
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), in 1979, it property afforded no
weight to the long history of the licensing practice—as the collective action
behind the formation of these licensing cooperatives surely gave them
substantial market power. Thus, blanket licenses were never a legacy
practice in the first place, as defined in this Article.
Ultimately, legacy and commonness are important to the extent that
they give information to antitrust decisionmakers. In the language of
empirical economics, legacy conduct provides “time series” data, and
commonness provides “cross sectional” data.34 If a practice has both a long
legacy and is common across firms within a market, then there is “panel”
data.35 The fundamental idea is that if the evidence leads to opportunities to
reduce judicial burdens without substantially sacrificing accuracy, whether
it be for finding harm or showing benefits, then we should explore those
possibilities.
I.

RULE OF REASON AND PRESUMPTIONS IN ANTITRUST

This Part provides a brief background on the three-step rule of reason
framework utilized by courts to administer antitrust cases that fall outside of
a per se condemnation. In order to prevent each antitrust inquiry from
turning into a full-blown cost benefit analysis and the associated
administrative costs, courts have adopted presumptions to help assess
various business practices. What is of particular interest, for the purposes of
30. 999 S. Ct. 1551 (1979).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See ORLEY ASHENFELTER, PHILLIP B. LEVINE, & DAVID J. ZIMMERMAN, STATISTICS
AND ECONOMETRICS: METHODS AND APPLICATIONS 246 (2003) (explaining time series data as
a set of time ordered observations of the same variable, such as the price of a product over
time); id. at 262 (explaining cross-sectional data is a set of observations for multiple subjects
at a point in time, such as the price of a product on a given day for all the firms in the market).
35. See id. (explaining panel data is a set of observations for multiple subjects over time).
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this Article, is how presumptions are formed and changed. What type of
evidence is required? This will inform the subsequent discussion regarding
if or when courts should use presumptions as it relates to legacy conduct.
A. The Three-Step Rule of Reason Framework
U.S. antitrust laws are governed under the consumer welfare standard.36
Under this standard, courts assess the legality of various practices, whether
it be for mergers, joint ventures, or unilateral conduct, based on the ultimate
impact on consumers and the competitive process. Since the beginning,
antitrust laws have always had an adaptability driven by new economic
learning and insights.37
Within this standard, certain types of conduct are considered per se
illegal as they are almost always harmful to consumers and the competitive
process.38 The canonical example is price fixing among rivals—as there is
little redeeming social value in allowing competitors to set the joint terms of
trade to the detriment of consumers.39 Of course, some categories of
coordination, such as, joint ventures and other cooperatives, can lead to
innovative products that would not exist but for the coordination and, thus,
are not per se illegal.40

36. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed the
Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd.
of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (“A restraint that has the effect of
reducing the importance of consumer preference in setting price and output is not consistent
with this fundamental goal of antitrust law.”). See also Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC,
807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining the consumer welfare standard as the
“lodestar that shall guide the contemporary application of the antitrust laws”). See generally
Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405 (2013) (detailing the evolution of antitrust jurisprudence to the
current consumer welfare standard).
37. See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933)
(explaining that antitrust laws have always had an evolutionary character that is more in-line
with the common law: “As a charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.”); United
States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596, 620–21 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting) (“Senator Sherman
[stated] ‘I admit that it is difficult to define in legal language the precise line between lawful
and unlawful combinations. This must be left for the courts to determine in each particular
case.’” (quoting 21 Cong. Rec. 2457, 2460)).
38. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771, 104 S.
Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411,
432–36 (1990).
39. See United States v. Socony–Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 passim (1940).
40. See, e.g., Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 999 S. Ct. at 1564
(“Joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements are also not usually unlawful, at least not
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Everything outside of a per se condemnation, however, falls under the
rule of reason umbrella.41 Conceptually, this means the conduct is neither
per se illegal nor per se legal. In practice, rule of reason is more of a “sliding
scale.”42 Depending on the nature of the conduct and established precedents,
the slide can move very close to a per se condemnation43 or to one closer to
a per se legality.44
While the plaintiff always maintains the burden of persuasion, in order
to administer the rule of reason, courts have developed a three-step burden
shifting framework.45 Step One is a determination of whether there is harm
to competition from a practice,46 where the burden of production is on the
plaintiff. If this burden is met, then the plaintiff has met its prima facia
burden. In Step Two, the burden of production shifts to the defendant, who

as price-fixing schemes, where the agreement on price is necessary to market the product at
all.”); American Needle v. National Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2206–07 (2010) (ruling
that NFL merchandise licensing activities, when coordinated across all the teams in the
league, should be considered under a rule of reason).
41. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 1, 58 (1911); Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526
U.S. 756, at 758 (1998) (“What is required . . . is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the
circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint.”). Notably, one could frame per se illegality
as a presumption within a larger rule of reason framework. See also Andrew I. Gavil & Steven
C. Salop, Probability, Presumptions and Evidentiary Burdens in Antitrust Analysis:
Revitalizing the Rule of Reason for Exclusionary Conduct, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 2107, 2117
(2017) (“A more precise statement of the ‘per se rule,’ for example, is ‘per se
unreasonableness’—an application of the rule of reason that involves an irrebuttable
presumption that the conduct is highly likely to unreasonably restrain competition.”);
GREGORY J. WERDEN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANTITRUST 277 (2020) (calling the per se rule “a
special case of the rule of reason.”).
42. See Cal. Dental Ass’n. v. Federal Trade Com’n, 526 U.S. 1604, 1617 (1999).
43. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). See
also Hovenkamp, supra note 23, at 128 (“While the Court [in Engineers] did not speak of a
‘quick look’ or articulate its mode of analysis, it was clearly applying something that fell
between per se and full rule of reason analysis.”).
44. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’n v. Law Off. of Curtis Trinko, 124 S. Ct. 872, 881 (2004)
(“[T]he few existing exceptions from the proposition that there is no duty to aid
competitors.”).
45. See, e.g., Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2284. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 23, at
103–04.
46. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)) (explaining that anticompetitive
harm is an injury that impairs the competitive process, which focuses on consumers and not
competitors); see also id. (“The antitrust laws, however, were enacted for ‘the protection of
competition not competitors.’”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (“[T]o be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must have an ‘anticompetitive
effect.’ That is, it must harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers. In contrast,
harm to one or more competitors will not suffice.”).
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offers evidence of procompetitive efficiencies.47 Finally, if such efficiencies
are identified, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff in Step
Three to argue that the benefits from Step Two could be achieved through
less restrictive means. There is arguably a Step Four, where the court weighs
these various effects.48
The three-step rule of reason framework is a useful paradigm for courts
to order and consider the various anticompetitive and procompetitive
evidence. Yet, this ordering is more of a conceptual idea rather than a strict
blueprint on how cases proceed.49 For example, if there is a strong efficiency
justification, then this will color how courts will consider the anticompetitive
harm and vice versa. Inevitably, there will be a degree of backwards
induction, where the defendant will anticipate the plaintiff’s rebuttal in Step
Three and, thus, will incorporate that anticipated rebuttal in Step Two. In
turn, in Step One, the plaintiff will anticipate and incorporate the defendant’s
rebuttal to the rebuttal.50 All the while, the court is likely continually
updating its priors, perhaps in a Bayesian manner, based on the evidence
developed at each stage.
B. Developing Presumptions
While the basic infrastructure and scaffolding of an antitrust case is the
three-step burden shifting framework, how do courts actually weigh all the
various pieces of evidence? One approach is to explicitly consider all the
relevant benefits and costs from a given practice. Even so, rarely would such
an exercise boil down to a precise mathematical balancing.51 On this point,
Judge Robert Bork explained that “[w]eighing effects in any direct sense will

47. See generally Gavil & Salop, supra note 41, at 2110:
The plaintiff, public or private, must meet an initial burden of production sufficient to show
that the conduct is likely to be anticompetitive. If it makes that showing, the burden of
production shifts to the defendant, who can undermine the plaintiff’s evidence . . . and/or offer
affirmative evidence showing a recognized procompetitive justification likely to eliminate
any anticompetitive tendency of its conduct.
48. See Michael A. Carrier, The Four-Step Rule of Reason, 33 ANTITRUST 50, 50–55
(2019).
49. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Balancing, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 369, 373
(2016) (“[B]alancing is a very poor label for what courts actually do.”).
50. Id. at 381 (“[W]hen the government makes a prima facie case, it already takes into
account what might be considered ‘ordinary’ or typical efficiency gains that mergers are likely
to produce.”).
51. See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, Cross-Market Balancing of Competitive Effects: What
Is the Law, and What Should It Be?, 43 J. CORP. L. 119, 139–140 (2017) (“[T]he rule of reason
asks only which competitive effect from a restraint predominates . . . the determination of a
restraint’s predominant effect on competition need not be quantitative or precise.”).
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usually be beyond judicial capabilities.”52
Given the limitations of courts, and even agencies, to fully consider the
benefits and costs of a given practice, the real question for antitrust
jurisprudence is how to best determine the impact of various practices on
consumer welfare knowing these limitations.53 This is where presumptions
come into play.54 When should courts adopt presumptions, and, given a
presumption, how should courts assess their efficacy and value? Currently,
the most widely held normative approach is the error cost framework.55 This
involves considering the administrative cost savings as well as the
probability and costs of falsely condemning a procompetitive practice, that
is, a Type I error, against the probability and costs of improperly allowing
anticompetitive practices, that is, a Type II error.
Under this framework, the clearest case for implementing a
presumption is when it would lower administrative costs while not changing,
or even perhaps lowering, the likelihood of a false positive or negative.56 The
harder cases are when presumptions significant lower administrative costs
while increasing the likelihood of either a false positive or negative.
Naturally, presumptions should be based on readily available information.57

52. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 230 n.11 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
53. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983). As
Justice (then Judge) Breyer stated:
[W]hile technical economic discussion helps to inform the antitrust laws, those
laws cannot precisely replicate the economists’ (sometimes conflicting) views.
For, unlike economics, law is an administrative system the effects of which
depend upon the content of rules and precedents only as they are applied by
judges and juries in courts and by lawyers advising their clients. Rules that seek
to embody every economic complexity and qualification may well, through the
vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive, undercutting the very
economic ends they seek to serve.
54. See generally Salop, supra note 22, at 3 (“Many antitrust presumptions are based on
and represent the court’s view of the likely competitive impact of a category of restraint
inferred from market facts.”).
55. See Easterbrook, supra note 25, at 4. See generally Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
56. See Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition through the Aspen/Kodak
Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495, 495 (1999) (“[I]n some cases bright-line rules can reduce
the transactions costs of operating the judicial system without markedly increasing the
likelihood or costs of judicial errors.”).
57. See id. at 495–96 (“The key to developing good truncated rules is to base them on
readily observable conduct whose presence or absence is highly correlated with the
conclusion a court would reach were it to conduct a full analysis.”). See also C. Frederick
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What is the impact of a presumption on error costs?58 These debates
are almost never ending59 and have only intensified with the growth of digital
markets.60 Undoubtedly, a principled presumption has to be based on some
estimate on error costs: the better the estimate, the better the presumption.
For example, economic research—both theoretical and empirical—can be a
catalyst to either develop new presumptions, discard old ones, or defend
existing ones. The point is that courts need some basis to adopt or modify a
presumption that go beyond mere conjecture and speculation.
One of the most fundamental presumptions is that conduct should be
considered under a different lens when a firm has substantial market power.61
This presumption is logically based on the recognition that the presence of
substantial market power implies a non-trivial probability that business
practices can be used to achieve anticompetitive ends—whereas, without
market power, these practices are not able to achieve that same effect. A
related presumption is that courts can infer substantial market power from
market shares.62 Thus, in monopolization cases, a plaintiff can meet its prima
Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41
(1999) (detailing decision theory and the process of making decisions with imperfect
information).
58. This Article uses the phrase “error costs” to broadly capture both the social harm
from a false positive or negative as well as the probability that the error will occur.
59. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Robert H. Gertner, Intellectual Property, Antitrust,
and Strategic Behavior, 3 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 29, 47 (2003) (“Analyses and
arguments over the choice of the best rule for particular types of conduct have filled volumes
of law and economics journals.”).
60. See, e.g., Gavil & Salop, supra note 41, at 2112 (“Continued reliance on what are
now exaggerated fears of ‘false positives,’ and failure adequately to consider the harm from
‘false negatives,’ have led courts to impose excessive demands of proof on plaintiffs that belie
both established procedural norms and sound economic analysis.”); Majority Staff House
Report, supra note 11, at 395 (“Furthermore, the Subcommittee should examine the creation
of a statutory presumption that a market share of 30% or more constitutes a rebuttable
presumption of dominance by a seller, and a market share of 25% or more constitute a
rebuttable presumption of dominance by a buyer.”).
61. See Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 99 S. Ct. 1567 at 1567 (“And, of
course, it is well settled that a sales practice that is permissible for a small vendor, at least
when no coercion is present, may be unreasonable when employed by a company that
dominates the market.”). See also Areeda, supra note 24, at 301 (“A given act might be
significantly anticompetitive only when the actor possesses substantial market power.”). See
infra Section II.A for a detailed discussion of antitrust market power.
62. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 25, at 74 (“In monopolization cases . . . courts often
presume that defendants with high market share have monopoly power[.]”). Importantly,
while market share is often used as a proxy for market power, it is only that—a proxy. See
W. Parcel Express v. UPS, 190 F.3d 974, 975 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that although a firm
owns a dominate share in the market, it does not possess market power unless there are
significant barriers to enter that market); see also Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc.,
423 F.3d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 2005).
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facie burden by (a) showing high market shares and (b) demonstrating that
the conduct at issue “has a tendency to be anticompetitive.”63
In sum, substantial market power gives a firm the “capability” to inflict
antitrust injury under the Sherman Act. However, what if the firm engaged
in the same practice before and after obtaining market power? While this
fact does not negate the proposition that the practice, coupled with market
power, can be used for an anticompetitive end—all else equal, it reduces the
likelihood. In effect, the presence of legacy lowers the suspicion relative to
the counterfactual where the practice was solely adopted after the firm
achieved market power. The history of a firm’s conduct is the empirical
evidence that is directly applicable to case, market, and industry at hand.
This is the “time series” data. A fuller discussion of presumptions for legacy
conduct is reserved for infra Section III.A.
II.

THREE FACTOR ASSESSMENT OF LEGACY CONDUCT

At the core of antitrust law is an attempt to understand the effect of
various business practices on consumer welfare. Given this objective, a rule
of reason analysis can involve intricate economic modeling and empirical
studies, which significantly increase litigation and administration costs.64
Consequently, courts benefit from having reliable, conceptual guidelines to
evaluate conduct without having to generate a full welfare analysis from the
ground up for each case.
This Part explores whether examining the history and commonness of
a practice reduces litigation costs without increasing judicial error. While
the role of legacy is already part of antitrust, its use is often without a clear
blueprint.
In Grinnell, the Court explicitly invoked legacy when it explained what
is required if conduct is to be considered an antitrust violation under a
monopolization claim: “The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman
Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
63. See Gavil & Salop, supra note 41, at 2116.
Courts also recognized that a plaintiff could meet its burden of production for competitive
harm with a ‘double inference’: courts could infer market power from high market shares and
other factors in a defined market; combining this inference with conduct that has a tendency
to be anticompetitive, competitive harm could then be inferred—precisely because that
tendency increases in the presence of market power.
64. See, e.g., Note, A Suggested Role for Rebuttable Presumptions in Antitrust Restraint
of Trade Litigation, 1972 DUKE L.J. 595, 596 (1972) (“Thus, the typical suit involves the
presentation by the Government or by a private party plaintiff of a massive collection of
material, a presentation by the defendant of equally massive amounts of rebuttal material,
followed by an exhaustive legal-economic analysis of all the evidence by the court.”).
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market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident.”65 This oft-quoted language
is central to our understanding of the enforcement of antitrust law. In
essence, legitimately obtained market power, in of itself, is not a violation.66
According to Grinnell, legitimate market power is business success “as
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”
Could practices that were in place well before “the possession of monopoly
power” be reasonably considered part of the growth or development of
product as a consequence of superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident? This is the key question and a potential justification for a
procompetitive presumption for firms who have market power and are
accused of engaging in unreasonable restraints of trade.
This Part proposes three considerations that should govern the proper
assessment of cases involving legacy conduct under a rule of reason: (1) the
genesis of a practice and its relationship to when a firm obtained market
power; (2) the commonness of the practice within the market at issue; and
(3) the degree to which market conditions have changed over time and
whether such changes weaken efficiency claims that may once have been
compelling. While we can never reduce uncertainty to zero,67 these factors
can help courts reduce the need for more costly and complex analyses.
A. Factor One: Genesis
Legacy conduct can serve as a defense under the Sherman Act, Section
2 because the conduct was practiced before substantial market power was
achieved by the firm.68 Historic information can provide valuable insight
65. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
66. See also United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 –83 (1911); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 60-62 (1911); United States v. United States Steel Corp.,
251 U.S. 417, 450–51 (1920); United States v. Int’l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 429–32 (2d Cir. 1945);
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)
(“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system.”).
67. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell, Complexity, Diversity, and Antitrust, 51 ANTITRUST BULL.
165, 170 (2006) (“[I]n a complex market, even diligent enquiry will not bring the posterior
probability close to zero or to one: there will often be irreducible uncertainty, as scholars in
complexity science stress.”).
68. Cf., Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement if Innovation
Mattered Most, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 324 (2012). Nevertheless, competition law should not
somehow declare closed platforms illegal, or make every successful platform a utility. There
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into a business practice and, in particular, whether its use is efficient and
procompetitive, rather than anticompetitive. To that end, determining
precisely when the practice was implemented—relative to when a firm
achieved market power—is the first consideration. Figure 1 provides a
visualization of this idea.
Figure 1: Business Practice Over Time

All practices that are implemented before a firm achieves market power
are legacy practices. Of course, this begs the question: what is “market
power”? Within antitrust, the term means more than simply having control
over one’s own price—as most firms with differentiated products have this
ability.69 Rather, it is the ability to control significant parts of commerce
within a relevant product market, which includes the ability to raise the
market price and exclude competitors.70 Thus, the term “monopoly” does

must be important allowances for both non-arbitrary exclusion and for platforms that are
closed or semi-closed to begin with, and stay that way. The platform that declares itself closed
from the outset does not gain the advantages of inviting development on an open platform.
69. See Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Aftermarkets, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION
ECON. 143, 156 (1996)
[I]nstead of defining the degree of antitrust market power possessed by a firm in
terms of the firm’s own elasticity of demand, it is more useful to define a firm’s
antitrust market power in terms of whether changes in the firm’s prices have any
significant effect on market quantities and prices.
70. The threshold to have market power is not a specific market share number; although,
courts and agencies use a general rule of thumb of fifty percent or more in a well-defined
relevant market. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDE TO ANTITRUST LAWS: SINGLE FIRM
CONDUCT: MONOPOLIZATION DEFINED, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidanc
e/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/monopolization-defined/ [https://perma.cc/T22HM69U] Courts do not require a literal monopoly before applying rules for single firm conduct;
that term is used as shorthand for a firm with significant and durable market power—that is,
the long term ability to raise price or exclude competitors. . . . In addition, that leading position
must be sustainable over time: if competitive forces or the entry of new firms could discipline
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not necessarily mean a single seller but a firm with substantial and durable
market power.
The reality is that market power is a continuum with no set threshold.
Nonetheless, a central component of monopolization claims under Section 2
of the Sherman Act involves precisely this question: does a firm have
substantial market power or not?71 With this question in mind, we can
delineate the establishment of a practice into three possible zones of
implementation.
Figure 2: Zones of Implementation

The first zone captures practices that are associated with market entry.
All else equal, this is where a legacy defense would be the strongest.72 The
second zone is still legacy conduct, but the strength of the legacy diminishes
as the gap between implementation and the obtaining of market power gets
smaller.73 Finally, the third zone represents practices implemented after
market power is achieved. These are not legacy practices. Similar to the
second zone, for the third zone, the gap between market power and
implementation might matter. An example of a practice implemented in the
third zone is Microsoft’s response to Netscape’s entry, documented in U.S.
v. Microsoft, which involved, inter alia, exclusive agreements and tying.74
Of course, even if a practice is instituted after substantial market power is
the conduct of the leading firm, courts are unlikely to find that the firm has lasting market
power.
71. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71.
72. See Areeda, supra note 24, at 301 (“If a practice can be harmful, the magnitude of
the firm’s power bears on the magnitude of the harmful effects. And the less the actor’s power,
the greater the likelihood that any claimed legitimate purpose is the defendant’s true
motivation and the conduct’s true effect.”).
73. Implementing a practice in the second zone does not necessarily mean the legacy
defense is more marginal. For instance, suppose a firm entered and did not do all that well
for a while, but then employed the practice at issue and its success skyrocketed. Thus,
focusing solely on practices that facilitated the original entry can be unduly limiting.
74. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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achieved, this does not create a presumption of anticompetitive harm. For
instance, the practice could be a procompetitive response to entry, which
benefit consumers while harming less efficient rivals.75
We can think of condemning a practice as anticompetitive as weighing
two outcomes—the gains from stopping the practice if it is anticompetitive
(G) and the social loss from stopping the practice if it is actually
procompetitive (L): EV = pG + (1-p)L, where p is the probability that the
practice is anticompetitive.76 Under this simple framing, agencies and courts
should intervene when the expected value (EV) is positive. Various
evidence, however, can provide us with insights into the values of G, L, and
p. All else equal, the longer and stronger the legacy (that is, the greater the
gap between implementation and market power), the lower the probability
that the practice is anticompetitive, p.
In Epic v. Apple, Apple instituted the App Store and its various policies
one year after its entry. Thus, Apple’s practices would be considered to have
occurred in the second zone of Figure 2 (though pretty close to the first zone).
Did Apple have substantial market power in 2008? This is the key
consideration in assessing the relevance of legacy conduct—as it is for
virtually all Sherman Act allegations. Assuming Apple did not have
substantial market power in 2008, then the App Store policies of exclusivity
and a 30 percent transaction fee would be considered legacy practices.77
While Apple has modified its App Store polices since 2008, the changes have
been to loosen the original restrictions rather than implement new ones.78
There are two possibilities for a practice that was instituted long before
a firm achieved substantial market power. The first is that the practice was
procompetitive and remains procompetitive. The second is that the practice

75. See, e.g., Olympia Equip. Leasing v. W. Union Tel., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir.
1986) (“[T]he emphasis of antitrust policy shifted from the protection of competition as a
process of rivalry to the protection of competition as a means of promoting economic
efficiency.”).
76. Farrell, supra note 67, at 169.
77. Sven B. Völcker & Daniel Baker, Why there is No Antitrust Case against Apple’s
App Store, A Response to Geradin & Katsifis, working paper at 6, July 26, 2020, https://pape
rs.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3660896 [https://perma.cc/PS7J-LCNL]
Apple has consistently applied a commission since the launch of the App Store
in 2008, shortly following the release of the original iPhone in 2007. At that point,
by definition, Apple lacked market power. . . . Indeed, it is a hallmark of
effective competition that commercial terms do not change depending on the
market power of the actor.
78. Id. at 7 (“The few changes that Apple has made to its App Store policies—notably
the reader rule and lower rates for subscriptions—have tended to facilitate competitive entry
and expansion of third-party apps on the iOS platform rather than the reverse.”).
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was procompetitive and is now anticompetitive.79 This latter possibility is
similar to a point made by Justice Antonin Scalia when he wrote his dissent
in Eastman Kodak.80 While Justice Scalia was not discussing legacy
practices per se, he highlights the fundamental point that the same practice
can have different effects depending on the level of market power.81
Certainly, an exclusive agreement practiced by a monopolist should be
viewed through a different lens due to the monopolist’s market position and
ability to exclude others. Yet, there is no magical mechanism that moves a
previously procompetitive practice to an anticompetitive one.82 The
possibility remains that a previously procompetitive practice remains
procompetitive. That is the point of assessing legacy. It is one thing to
implement a new practice after achieving substantial market power, and it is
quite another to have implemented that same practice before reaching the
aforementioned market power. Assessing legacy offers more information to
a court and can lower the probability that a practice is anticompetitive.83 The
ultimate goal of assessing the strength of a legacy practice is not to prove
that it is procompetitive but to add an element to a court’s inquiry.
B. Factor Two: Commonness
The second consideration in assessing legacy business practices is
determining its commonness or ubiquity.
What information does
commonness give to courts? Even on its own, commonness indicates a
79. Of course, this is a simplification. A practice could be competitively neutral both
before and after market power—such as being part of a price discrimination scheme. In Re
Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 288 F.3d 1028 (7th Cir. 2002).
80. Cf. Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2093 (1992)
(“Where a defendant maintains substantial market power, his activities are examined through
a special lens: Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws—or that
might even be viewed as procompetitive—can take on exclusionary connotations when
practiced by a monopolist.”).
81. In fact, initially, Kodak did not have its restrictive policy regarding aftermarket
servicing. Indeed, the fact that it changed its policy is what led to the litigation and, ultimately,
liability. Id. Of course, the facts in Kodak are the opposite of maintaining a legacy practice
that gets challenged only after the firm obtains market power.
82. For instance, undoubtedly, a diaper manufacturer with a ninety percent share that uses
exclusive agreements presents very different issues from a manufacturer that has a ten percent
share. In this assessment, however, efficiency justifications are materially more credible if the
manufacturer with a ninety percent share originally implemented the agreements when it had
a ten percent share.
83. Cf., Gavil & Salop, supra note 41, at 2117 (“In moving away from reliance on bright
line approaches, the courts continued to use probability assessments to apply the rule of reason
flexibly, depending on the strength of the evidence presented by the parties and by recognizing
appropriate presumptions.”).
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practice has the potential to be welfare-enhancing and not associated with
attempts to maintain or expand antitrust market power. Some academics
have even suggested that ubiquitous practices used across markets should be
given considerable leeway when considering antitrust liability.84 Further, the
U.S. antitrust agencies also highlight the relevance of ubiquity when
assessing a business practice as it relates to intellectual property (IP)
bundling.85 A fortiori, these arguments would hold for ubiquitous practices
within a market. Even falling short of ubiquity, practices that are common
can indicate, with very little informational requirements, the potential to be
efficient and beneficial to social welfare. A key caveat, however, is that
commonness cannot be the result of industry coordination.86
The primary informational value from commonness is foundationally
based on whether a practice is observed across the market power spectrum.
If only firms with substantial market power engage in a specific practice,
then this can create a much different prior than if the practice is used by
smaller and dominant firms alike. This observation is not infallible,
84. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris & Vernon L. Smith, Antitrust and Bundles Discounts: An
Experimental Analysis, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 399, 406 (2008) (“[I]t seems unwise to condemn a
ubiquitously used business practice because of a possibility of harm that is not formally
modeled, much less empirically demonstrated.”); Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Economics of
Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust Law in the United States, 1 COMP. POL’Y INT’L 115, 145–46
(Autumn 2005) (“[W]ithout a reliable way to distinguish pro- and anticompetitive uses, any
rule that condemns ubiquitous business practices without a showing of likely harm to
competition would result in the widespread condemnation of efficient practices.”).
85. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION, 114 (2007)
[A]s a matter of their prosecutorial discretion, the Agencies will apply the rule of
reason when evaluating intellectual property tying and bundling agreements.
Given the ubiquitous use of these arrangements by businesses lacking in market
power and the efficiencies that such arrangements can often entail, these practices
usually are not anticompetitive.
86. See infra Section IV.C. discussion of Broadcast Music and NFL v. Ninth Inning. See
also Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal—
Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 659, 661 (2001) (“[I]n general, the
laws treat collective action differently (more harshly) than unilateral action, implicitly
adopting the view that collective action is more likely to create a competitive harm than is the
action of a single firm.”). If there is a coordination concern, then, naturally, commonness
could be an indicator coordination rather than efficiency. See Leegin Creative Leather
Products v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2719 (2007) (“Resale price maintenance, it is true,
does have economic dangers. . . . For example, the number of manufacturers that make use
of the practice in a given industry can provide important instruction. When only a few
manufacturers lacking market power adopt the practice, there is little likelihood it is
facilitating a manufacturer cartel.”). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements
and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135 (1984) (discussing how the uniformity of a
vertical control could be an indicator of collusion).
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however. Additionally, a lack of commonness is not necessarily an indicator
of something amiss.87 As Professor Joseph Farrell provocatively asks, “Isn’t
diversity of approach one of the benefits of competition?”88 Further,
industry-wide practices might not signal an efficient practice but rather a
practice that thrives due to coordination—either explicitly or tacitly.89 With
these caveats in mind, observing that firms with and without market power
engage in the same, or very similar, practices can strongly suggest a
procompetitive rationale.
An example of a case that involves a common, or even near ubiquitous,
practice is the FTC’s Google Search investigation from 2010 to 2013.90 The
agency investigated a series of antitrust allegations including “search bias,”
a term used to indicate anticompetitive misbehavior on the part of Google in
terms of how it displays its search results. The FTC ultimately closed its
investigation, as did several State Attorneys Generals.91 Yet, in 2015, the
European Commission (EC) issued formal charges against Google alleging
search bias and fined Google 2.42 billion euros for abuse of dominance in
Google Shopping.92 The issue of search bias, and more generally platform
87. See FTC v. Qualcomm, 969 F.3d 974, 990–91 (“Furthermore, novel business
practices—especially in technology markets—should not be ‘conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use.’ Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 91 (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co.,
356 U.S. at 5, 78 S. Ct. 514).”). See also Ronald H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A
Proposal for Research, in 3 ECONOMIC RESEARCH: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT: POLICY
ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 66, 68 (Victor R. Fuchs,
ed., 1972) (“[T]he association of the study of industrial organization with antitrust policy has
created a disposition to search for monopolistic explanations for all business practices whose
justification is not obvious to the meanest intelligence.”).
88. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 67, at 166; see Farrell, supra note 67, at 168 (“Diversity
is most valuable in complex markets, because in simple markets everyone knows what to
do.”).
89. See, e.g., Nat’l Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig. v. DirecTV, LLC,
933 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2019) (demonstrating competing corporations working together to
exclusively license a bundled NFL Sunday Ticket package rather than individually licensing
their games); Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 262 (D.
Conn. 2003) (showing conspiracy among dairy cooperatives to inflate the wholesale price of
dairy used to make ice cream through a manipulation of the price formula used across the
industry).
90. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FILE NO. 1110-0163, STATEMENT REGARDING GOOGLE’S
SEARCH PRACTICES, IN THE MATTER OF GOOGLE INC. (Jan. 3, 2013).
91. The states of Texas and Ohio closed their respective investigations in 2014. Zach
Miners, Ohio Closes Google Antitrust Investigation, PCWORLD (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.
pcworld.com/article/2882072/ohio-closes-google-antitrust-investigation.html [https://perma.
cc/H93J-Y3MV].
92. European Commission Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42
Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own
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bias, continues to garner significant antitrust attention.
Since Google introduced its online search engine in 1998, it has
undergone numerous technological and design changes.93 One of the most
prominent changes, and the basis for much of the antitrust allegations,
occurred in 2007, when Google introduced the concept of “universal
search.”94 Universal search involves the integration of specialized (or
“vertical”) search results, which are results within a narrow category such as
news, videos, and local businesses, with the unadorned “horizontal” search
results, that is, the plain blue links. Google created a composite results page
combining these two types of search results. The primary antitrust concern
was that Google was favoring its own specialized search results (e.g.,
YouTube, Google Maps), which necessarily pushes down the blue links of
sites with competing content (e.g., Yelp, TripAdvisor).
In 2007, Google likely already had substantial market power, so
universal search is not a legacy practice. However, the practice was soon
adopted by other search competitors, including Bing, Yahoo, and
DuckDuckGo, and now is ubiquitous across search engines.95 Of course,
precisely how each search engine engages in the practice matters
immensely.96 Nonetheless, the fact that a search engine such as
DuckDuckGo, which has no market power, also utilizes universal search is
important. While it does not prove Google’s implementation of universal
search is definitely procompetitive or legal under the antitrust laws, it
provides valuable information that the practice has the potential to increase
welfare and gains from trade given its ubiquity.
Like legacy, commonness can be helpful in assessing probabilities.

Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-171784_en.htm [https://perma.cc/6U8R-B6BY]. Christian Bergqvist, The Google I Decision in
a Nutshell, (Dec. 19, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3090645
[https://perma.cc/3VB2-LRYT].
93. See From the Garage to the Googleplex, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/a
bout/our-story/ [https://perma.cc/SXP2-D3LN] (discussing Google’s evolution over the
years).
94. Danny Sullivan, Google Launches “Universal Search” & Blended Results, SEARCH
ENGINE LAND (May 16, 2007), http://searchengineland.com/google-20-google-universal-sear
ch-11232/ [https://perma.cc/L3VE-A49N].
95. For example, on Google, Bing, Yahoo, and DuckDuckGo, the query “bbq restaurants
near me” (searched on Jan. 21, 2021, at 1:20 pm EST in Arlington, VA) all produced search
results pages that prominently featured a map with restaurant locations—along with pictures
and reviews for those various restaurants. Apparently, however, based on the results,
DuckDuckGo prefers Korean BBQ over American BBQ.
96. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright, Defining and Measuring Search Bias: Some Preliminary
Evidence (George Mason Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, No. 12 –14, 2011)
(describing a study that found that Bing preferences its own content more than Google).
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When a practice is common across the market power spectrum—particular a
practice that is virtually ubiquitous—then this lowers the likelihood of
anticompetitive harm, p, from the practice and likely raises the social loss
from stopping the practice if it is actually procompetitive (L). Thus, coupled
with a long legacy, widespread market use of a practice gives even further
information that a practice is more likely to be procompetitive than if the
practice was neither longstanding nor ubiquitous.
This is an argument that Apple arguably could make in the Epic case—
with some important complications. The primary competitor to examine is
Google with its Android operating system and policies regarding the Google
Play Store. While Google is more permissive in its app store policies,97 the
effect on the platform does not seem to be materially different.98 For
instance, in 2018, when Epic launched Fortnite on Android, it initially chose
to bypass Google Play entirely.99 However, Epic’s announcement created
uncertainty and immediate questions.100 Eventually, Epic chose to move
Fortnite to the Google Play Store after complaining that Android warnings
and other hinderances “puts software downloadable outside of Google Play
at a disadvantage.”101
What to make of these facts? While Google’s policy is not as restrictive
97. Users can download apps onto Android phones without going through the Google
Play Store, which is called “sideloading.” See, e.g., Chris Hoffman, 5+ Ways to Install
Android Apps on Your Phone or Tablet, HOW-TO GEEK, July 11, 2017, https://www.howtog
eek.com/161366/5-ways-to-install-android-apps-on-your-phone-or-tablet/ [https://perma.cc/J
6KE-S7TU]. However, users must go through a series of steps to alter their phone settings to
allow for sideloading, which could expose them to risk. Id. (“Note that this can be a security
risk, as it allows installation of apps from outside the Play Store, which could potentially
contain malware. If you enable this setting, it’s your job to install applications responsibly—
stay away from pirated games and other apps that may contain Android malware.”).
98. See Damien Geradin & Dimitrios Katsifis, The Antitrust Case Against the Apple App
Store, (Tilberg Univ. Working Paper No. 035, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf
m?abstract_id=3744192 [https://perma.cc/69ZP-NWE7], at 9 (“Google, on the other hand,
does not prohibit alternative app stores, and users may choose to use e.g., Samsung’s Galaxy
Store or Aptoide. However, users rarely do so in practice, instead preferring to access apps
through the pre-installed Google Play.”).
99. Nick Statt, Fortnite for Android Will Ditch Google Play Store for Epic’s Website,
THE VERGE (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/3/17645982/epic-games-fortn
ite-android-version-bypass-google-play-store/ [https://perma.cc/V2NV-Z2Q7].
100. Id. (“Reasonably, there are some concerns about how exactly this will work, and
whether it opens up Android users to any potential security or data privacy risks since running
third-party software outside the Play Store involves removing certain protections on Android
devices.”).
101. Lucas Matney, Epic Games Launches Fortnite on the Google Play Store and They’re
Not Happy About It, TECHCRUNCH, Apr. 21, 2020, https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/21/epicgames-launches-fortnite-on-the-google-play-store-and-theyre-not-happy-about-it/ [https://pe
rma.cc/EC24-HAJ9].
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as Apple’s, all apps must effectively go through the Google Play Store. With
this policy in place, Android grew its share from zero percent in 2009 to its
current market leading position.102 Thus, both Google and Apple obtained
their market leading positions, overtaking incumbents Nokia and Motorola,
with similar practices regarding how third-party software is downloaded and
interacts with their respective mobile operating systems. Can these same
practices now be a violation of U.S. antitrust laws based on a reduction in
consumer welfare? There are certainly arguments to be made by both sides
to address this question; however, explicitly weighing legacy and
commonness can aid in that determination.
C. Factor Three: Changing Market Conditions
The third consideration when assessing legacy practices is whether
market conditions have sufficiently changed as to make the initial
procompetitive justification(s) no longer valid. This factor is really an
extension of examining the genesis of a practice. While the first factor is
primarily concerned with comparing two events, that is, (a) when a practice
was implemented and (b) when a firm achieved market power, this second
factor gets at the heart of the procompetitive justification.
Particularly in dynamic industries, there can be regulatory, legal, and
technological changes that render a previously legitimate justification
invalid. For instance, suppose that, shortly after entering, a seller
implemented exclusive agreements with distributors to solve a free-rider
problem. Without the exclusives, distributors would use the seller’s
promotional data to help sell other products for which the distributor enjoyed
a higher margin. If, over time, the industry solves this free-rider problem
without exclusives—for instance, with a big data analytical approach, then
the original exclusivity justification is no longer valid.103

102. See, e.g., iClarified, supra note 16 (showing the smartphone market over time); John
Callaham, From Android Market to Google Play: A Brief History of the Play Store, ANDROID
AUTHORITY, (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.androidauthority.com/android-market-google-playhistory-754989/ [https://perma.cc/MCF3-56F7] (discussing the trajectory of the play store).
103. One real-world example of changing market conditions is the shifting landscape to
license music, which was the subject of Broadcast Music v. CBS, 999 S. Ct. 1551. While
music cooperatives such as BMI and ASCAP can significantly lower transaction costs, recent
changes in digital technology appear to be weakening this justification. See Bruce H.
Kobayashi, Opening Pandora’s Black Box: A Coasian 1937 View Of Performance Rights
Organizations In 2014, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 925, 926 (2015) (describing how “recent
attempts by large music publishers to withdraw their ‘new media’ rights from the [music
cooperatives] . . . can be explained by the lower costs of market transactions brought on by
digital technology.”).
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In some instances, examining the commonness of a practice (factor two)
can indirectly address this question of whether market conditions have
sufficiently changed. If firms without market power also presently engage
in the same practice, then this fact points to a significantly greater likelihood
that the practice is being used for procompetitive purposes—rather than
harming competition.
As for the App Store, how much has changed since 2008? Are market
conditions different? If so, in what way? Fundamentally, since its
introduction, the iPhone is a “closed system.” This means that its primary
components, that is, hardware, operating system, and app delivery, are
tightly controlled by one entity, in this case, Apple.104 In fact, Apple’s closed
nature is arguably part of its “brand.”105 In the early 2000s, there were strong
normative priors among some antitrust scholars that open systems were
superior to closed ones as measured by consumer welfare.106 The intuition
is straightforward: open systems represent modularity, flexibility, and
freedom, while closed systems represent uniformity, control, and captivity.
Yet, the success of the iPhone and its closely controlled delivery has
put a damper on that ideal.107 Market experience has demonstrated that
strong vertical controls and governance over one’s “system” is not
necessarily a sign of market power and, most certainly, is not necessarily a
104. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, A Fight Over Freedom at Apple’s Core, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, https://www.ft.com/content/fcabc720-10fb-11df-9a9e-00144feab49a/
[https://perma.cc/M9CW-QKT2] (“Despite outsiders being invited to write software, the
iPhone thus remains tightly tethered to its vendor—the way that the Kindle is controlled by
Amazon.”). The distinctions between open and closed systems, however, are not always clear
cut. See Hanno F. Kaiser, Are “Closed Systems” an Antitrust Problem?, 7 COMP. POL’Y INT’L.
91, 94 (2011) (“Open versus closed is therefore not a binary distinction but a matter of degree.
All real-world systems are open in part and closed in others.”).
105. See, e.g., Zittrain, supra note 104 (“‘We define everything that is on the phone,’ said
Mr. Jobs. ‘You don’t want your phone to be like a PC. The last thing you want is to have
loaded three apps on your phone and then you go to make a call and it doesn’t work any
more.’”).
106. See, e.g., TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION
EMPIRES 6 (2010) (“History shows a typical progression of information technologies . . . from
a freely accessible channel to one strictly controlled by a single corporation or cartel—from
open to closed system.”); Carlton & Gertner, supra note 59, at 31–32 (“We argue that winners
in early stages of competition often have the incentive and ability to close the system and
thereby reduce subsequent competition.”).
107. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 15 (“The App Store changed all of that: Apple
effectively extended the trust it had earned with users over the years to all developers in the
App Store. Users could install whatever they wanted, confident the app would not mess up
their phone, rip them off, or be a virus.”); Majority Staff House Report, supra note 11, at 17
(acknowledging that since its launch “in 2008, the App Store revolutionized software
distribution on mobile devices, reducing barriers to entry for app developers and increasing
the choices available to consumers.”).
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sign of anticompetitive injury. Fundamentally, a closed system is one where
the proprietor implements strong vertical restraints as part of its governance
of the platform or ecosystem—often coupled with a degree of vertical
integration. As Hanno Kaiser explains: “In its path-breaking 1977 Sylvania
decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that modular market structures
are also vulnerable to systemic market failures stemming from transaction
costs, lack of coordination, opportunism, free-riding, and double
marginalization among others.”108 As with almost every economic
organization, there are trade-offs between open and closed systems. While
strong vertical restraints such as absolute control over all downloaded
software on the iPhone restricts, by its very nature, the freedom of some
suppliers to do what they want, the procompetitive effects from such a
restraint could be significant.109
Thus, returning to our question, arguably, market conditions are
changing, but in a manner that would suggest greater concern for privacy
violations and software intrusions rather than less.110 A closed system such
as the iPhone can internalize and prevent negative externalities that could be
present in more open systems.111 Further, research suggests that the 30
percent ad valorum tax on each transaction in the App Store has no impact
on the final price that consumers pay.112

108. Kaiser, supra note 104, at 95.
109. See, e.g., Kevin J. Boudreau & Andrei Hagiu, Platform Rules: Multi-Sided Platforms
as Regulators, in PLATFORMS, MARKETS, AND INNOVATION 163, 163 (Annabelle Gawer, ed.,
2009) (describing the fall of Atari’s dominance in video games in the 1980s “because it had
not developed technology for locking out unauthorized games, Atari was unable to prevent
the entry of opportunistic developers, who flooded the market with poor-quality games.”).
110. Cf., Brooke Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling
Lack of Control Over Their Personal Information, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Nov. 15, 2019,
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confu
sed-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/ [https://perma.cc/H3JC-N
UZW] (detailing how many users feel an overall lack of control over their online privacy).
111. See Kaiser, supra note 104, at 99
[L]ow-quality contributors do not fully internalize the costs that they impose on
the more committed platform participants and might therefore have incentives to
release poor products, turn a quick profit, and have other platform constituents
suffer the consequences. Quality control has thus long been recognized as a bona
fide business justification for vertical restraints and refusals to deal.
112. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, What’s Next in Apple Inc. v Pepper?
The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and the Economics of Pass-Through, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 249,
266 (2018–19) (finding that Apple’s ad valorum royalty rate does not cause a pass-through
charge to iPhone users compared to a world with a competitive app store market).
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CONDITIONS TO JUSTIFY A PROCOMPETITIVE PRESUMPTION, A
CAVEAT, AND AVOIDING MORAL HAZARD

A. When a Procompetitive Presumption is Merited
In current policy discussions regarding the digital economy, there is
certainly no shortage of proposals for new presumptions to make it easier for
plaintiffs to win.113 It is easy to understand why. There is a sense that “big
tech” platforms are getting too big and powerful.114 Certainly, presumptions
allow courts to more nimbly navigate through often complex business
practices and economize on the weight of evidence needed to make sound
decisions.115 Yet, presumptions need to be grounded in market realities.
This leads to the question: What legal treatment should legacy and
common or ubiquitous conduct receive? This Article proposes that a
structured inquiry into the genesis, commonness, and consistency of the
practice and market conditions should be integrated into each step of the rule
of reason framework. Further, this Article proposes that legacy business
conduct that (i) was instituted long before a firm achieved substantial market
power—particularly at the time of entry—and (ii) is common across
competitors and degrees of market power indicates that the practice is likely
to be procompetitive, though not inevitably so. When these conditions are
satisfied, defendants should be afforded a substantially reduced burden in
proving efficiencies under a rule of reason analysis commensurate with the

113. See, e.g., Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the
Committee on the Judiciary, Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets, 2020, https://ju
diciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/Z8R
V-YSGM], at 395 (“[T]he Subcommittee should examine the creation of a statutory
presumption that a market share of 30% or more constitutes a rebuttable presumption of
dominance by a seller . . . “); STIGLER COMM. ON DIGIT. PLATFORMS, FINAL REPORT (2019),
https://www.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms---committee-r
eport---stigler-center.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/A98F-LK27] at 93 (recommending that
legislation “implement a recalibration . . . by prescribing rebuttable presumptions that would
ease the high proof requirements currently imposed on antitrust plaintiffs and place on
defendants a more rigorous burden of proving efficiencies.”).
114. See generally John M. Yun, Does Antitrust Have Digital Blind Spots?, 72 S.C. L.
REV. 305 (2021) (detailing and assessing some of the bases premises and priors of those
advocating for more aggressive antitrust in the digital sector).
115. See, infra Section I.B. See also Easterbrook, supra note 25, at 14 (“Courts should use
the economists’ way out. They should adopt some simple presumptions that structure antitrust
inquiry. Strong presumptions would guide businesses in planning their affairs by making it
possible for counsel to state that some things do not create risks of liability.”).
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strength of the legacy evidence—that is, they should be afforded a
marginally procompetitive presumption.
A parallel can be found in the evidentiary standards under the Sherman
Act, Section 1, to determine whether observed parallel conduct across firms
within a market stems from collective action or from unilateral decisions.
The type of circumstantial evidence which can be used to establish collective
action are referred to as “plus factors.” These are factors that tip the scale in
favor of finding coordination—acting, in a sense, like a tiebreaker.116
Notably, this proposal falls short of a rebuttable presumption of
legality.117 Part of the reason is practical. While this Article has argued that
considering the three-factor approach to legacy conduct economizes on
adjudicating complex antitrust cases, a legacy review still involves some
degree of inquiry and fact-finding. Thus, in practice, this proposal would not
disturb the three-step rule of reason framework, but it would impact the
degree and quality of proof required at each step. The argument being made
here is that, if a specific fact pattern emerges after examining a practice’s
legacy, commonness, and consistency, then this should be considered
probative evidence that the practice is procompetitive.118
116. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law,
110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 393 (2011) (“Plus factors are economic actions and outcomes, above
and beyond parallel conduct by oligopolistic firms, that are largely inconsistent with unilateral
conduct but largely consistent with explicitly coordinated action.”).
117. If one accepts Judge Easterbrook’s conjecture that false positives (that is, falsely
condemning procompetitive practices) are more harmful in antitrust than false negatives (that
is, improperly allowing anticompetitive practices)—and not all do—then, arguably, an
alternative proposal is to raise the standard of proof for plaintiffs to something stronger than
the preponderance of the evidence. See Joshua Wright & Murat C. Mungan, The Easterbrook
Theorem: An Application to Digital Markets, 130 YALE L.J.F. 622 (2021) (demonstrating that
Easterbrook’s Theorem can seamlessly interface with the existing antitrust infrastructure
without disrupting established standards and presumptions).
118. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 399 (2003) (suggesting that commonness, in the context of
exclusive dealing, should play an important role for courts. In fact, they argue that
commonness across industries is sufficient to grant a procompetitive presumption:
Balancing the costs and benefits of an exclusionary practice that also has
efficiency characteristics may well be beyond the capacity of the courts. But here
is a possible approach. If the practice is one employed widely in industries that
resemble the monopolist’s but are competitive, there should be a presumption
that the monopolist is entitled to use it as well. For the widespread adoption of
the practice implies that it has significant economizing properties, which implies
in turn that to forbid the monopolist to use it will drive up his costs and so (if they
are marginal costs) his profit-maximizing monopoly price. The burden should
shift to the plaintiff to show that, nevertheless, forbidding the use of the practice
will offset the effect of the prohibition on the monopolist’s costs by increasing
the rate or speed of new entry. Or, if this is deemed too difficult an issue for a
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Specifically, this presumption would have the most impact in Step Two,
where the defendant is tasked with presenting evidence that the conduct
promotes efficiency.119 Legacy conduct and commonness would be evidence
supporting the defendant’s claim. By this point in the proceeding, the
question of market power and the potential for the practice to harm
consumers will have already been addressed. Having a marginally
procompetitive presumption would naturally lighten the burden of
production for the defendant to provide a cognizable efficiency
justification.120 The plaintiff in Step One will have (or should have)
presented a coherent theory of harm. Whether the legacy and commonness
of a practice helps a decisionmaker assess the validity of efficiency
arguments will depend on the particular case, and perhaps there will be
instances where a legacy determination is not particularly relevant. Such a
scenario, however, would seem to be uncommon, given that the history and
current use of a practice offer courts real-world information to validate
theories of harm and efficiencies. Even if a practice does not fit neatly into
a long legacy which is common across the market power spectrum, there is
still value in weighing these considerations and adjusting the burden of
production according to the strength of the evidence.
B. A Caveat: Intra-Market v. Intra-Market Commonness
What if a particular type of conduct is common across industries but not
within an industry? That is, what if there is inter-market commonness but
little intra-market commonness? For example, suppose that a particular type
of vertical restraint such as exclusivity, resale price maintenance (RPM), or

court to resolve, proof that the challenged practice is widespread in competitive
industries should be a complete defense.
119. Notably, as discussed in infra Section I.B., in practice, these various steps are all of
one piece in determining the legality of a practice. As Gregory Werden clarifies:
The popular notion that the rule of reason admits an “efficiencies defense” is misleading
because efficiency, as such, cannot justify a restraint. An admissible justification must be a
variation on theme that the restraint, when properly viewed, actually promotes competition.
Every cognizable justification is a fact-based narrative about the competitive process in which
the restraint makes the defendant, or the market as a whole, work better to serve customers.
GREGORY J. WERDEN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANTITRUST 255–56 (2020).
120. This point is strengthened if we recognize the difficulty in providing efficiencies. See,
e.g., Carlton, supra note 86, at 675 (“Efficiencies are hard to measure, and the benefit of the
doubt should go to defendants, not to plaintiffs; otherwise, the continued generation of the
large efficiency benefits responsible for raising our standards of living will be jeopardized.”).
Of course, just because efficiencies are hard to measure does not mean they are there and are
substantial.
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bundling is common in similar, albeit different, relevant markets? Certainly,
inter-market commonness provides some information about the merits of a
practice, and academic policy debates routinely appeal to inter-market
commonness when forming presumptions—particularly for vertical
restraints.121 These debates are important as they can lead courts to change
legal rules regarding specific conduct, such as moving practices like
minimum RPM, maximum RPM, and tying away from a strict per se
condemnation to something less.122
The question, however, is whether inter-market commonness, coupled
with legacy, should be used to establish a procompetitive presumption for a
specific case. There are good arguments against this prescription. Interindustry experiences do less work in helping assess the legality of conduct
for a specific case and market.123 Each market is different, and prior studies
that give a broader sense of various restraints are unlikely to perfectly map
to the market at issue. Further, each manifestation of conduct is different,
e.g., exclusively can differ based on length, scope, and repercussions from
violations. Of course, there are also differences across firms within a market
but, all else equal, the ability to discern and factor those differences are likely
significantly less burdensome than looking across firms in different markets.
In sum, while understanding inter-market commonness is critical for
antitrust policy, it is arguably less useful for shifting or reducing the burdens
of production for a particular case. Thus, a key caveat is that courts should
only consider common or ubiquitous conduct when it is within a relevant
market, not whether it is also common across other industries or markets.
This is not to suggest inter-market commonness is irrelevant as an indicium
of a procompetitive practice, particularly as it pertains to antitrust policy
more generally. But, as far as implementing a legal presumption, the
strongest case is for intra-market practices. In essence, this caveat is baking

121. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A DecisionTheoretic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469, 471 (2001) (“Moreover, in formulating a rule,
the prevalence of tying for procompetitive reasons is an important consideration. Because
beneficial tying is so pervasive, rules against tying could be harmful even with a small rate of
falsely labeling tying as anticompetitive.”).
122. See generally Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
899 (2007) (moving minimum RPM away from a per se condemnation to a rule of reason);
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 –18 (1997) (moving maximum RPM away from a per
se condemnation to a rule of reason); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,
15–16 (1984) (narrowing the scope of a per se condemnation of tying).
123. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 25, at 86 (“This literature mistakenly infers that firms
cannot readily use these practices to harm competition, either at all or on balance after
accounting for efficiencies.”).
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in the principle of subsidiarity.124
C. Does a Marginally Procompetitive Presumption Create a Moral
Hazard Problem?
If a firm enjoys a marginally procompetitive presumption for a legacy
business practice, then this, in a sense, provides some degree of “insurance”
to the firm from antitrust liability—as long as it keeps the practice relatively
the same. Consequently, a firm might be reticent to change a legacy practice,
lest it lose its insurance. In other words, the procompetitive presumption
would create a moral hazard problem.125 This is certainly a potential
concern.126
We can consider the problem with a simple example. Suppose that a
firm with market power has restrictive terms of service that include a
requirement of exclusivity to interface with its product, but the exclusivity
provision has remained unchanged since the firm first entered the market.
Given a procompetitive presumption, let us assume that the probability of
antitrust liability from continuing the practice is ten percent and damages
would be $500 if the firm was found liable. Further, suppose that the firm
enjoys an incremental profit of $1,000 each period that is directly attributable
to the exclusivity provision. In expectation, the firm’s expected damages
from antitrust liability are fifty dollars (= $500 x 0.10). Given that the benefit
of the practice is $1,000 and the cost (in expectation) is fifty dollars, it is
optimal for the firm to continue to engage in the practice.
Now suppose that the firm is contemplating an expansion of the scope
of the exclusivity, such as including another class of consumers. This
expansion would negate the legacy protection and, consequently, would
124. Subsidiarity is “the principle that decisions should always be taken at the lowest
possible level or closest to where they will have their effect, for example in a local area rather
than for a whole country.” Subsidiarity, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambr
idge.org/dictionary/english/subsidiarity/ [https://perma.cc/9J8Q-TKR6] (last visited Oct. 6,
2021).
125. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. ECON. 541, 541
(1979) (“Moral hazard refers here to the tendency of insurance protection to alter an
individual’s motive to prevent loss.”).
126. There is also the possibility that firms, anticipating perhaps becoming very
successful, will inefficiently adopt anticompetitive practices “early,” thereby creating a track
record of legacy use and strengthening a procompetitive presumption. While possible,
engaging in injurious practices without substantial market power is likely to hinder becoming
very successful in the first place. Nonetheless, this could be a concern if the success of a
product is in some ways “inevitable” and the only downside to instituting an anticompetitive
practice too early is that it somewhat delays success but does not stop it or significantly reduce
its likelihood.
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increase the probability of liability to, let us assume, fifty percent. If we hold
damages constant at $500, then the expected damage would become $250 (=
$500 x 0.50). This is a $200 increase in the expected cost from engaging in
the practice. If the additional benefit to the firm from making the change
was less than $200, then the firm would not make the change, even if it would
increase social welfare. However, if the firm never enjoyed the legacy
protection and always faced a probability of liability of fifty percent, then
the firm would make the change. Why? Because, without the presumption,
the probability of liability from the practice would be fifty percent both
before and after the change.127 Thus, the expected damage would be $250
both before and after the change in conduct. Consequently, changing the
exclusivity provision would not result in a change in expected antitrust costs.
As long as the expected benefit from the change is positive, the firm will
make the change.
Of course, the above example is highly stylized. If we introduce
additional assumptions and values, we could get a different result.
Nonetheless, it points to the fact that making any change that directionally is
more restrictive can result in large increases in expected marginal costs
because of the potential loss of the legacy protection. There are, however, a
number of factors that potentially mitigate this concern.
First, this concern is only applicable when a practice becomes more
restrictive. In contrast, a firm would still enjoy a marginally procompetitive
presumption if it relaxed the restriction, which might eliminate any cause for
a case in the first place. For instance, if Apple began to allow some limited
distribution for software outside of the App Store, it would still enjoy a legal
presumption for the software that still must go through the App Store. Thus,
firms are certainly free to relax or even abandon a specific practice all
together.
Second, the loss of a procompetitive presumption means the practice
will be assessed under a fuller rule of reason. Consequently, practices that
legitimately and significantly increase welfare for both consumers and
producers will not be unduly disincentivized because firms will still have the
ability to defend the conduct in court.
Finally, as with most legal rules, there are tradeoffs. The current per se
illegality for price fixing almost certainly will prevent a few efficiencyenhancing practices from being implemented. Nonetheless, the per se rule
minimizes administrative costs and avoids lengthy litigation over

127. We could also incorporate a slightly higher probability of liability after the change,
e.g., fifty-five percent instead of remaining at fifty percent.
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determinations of market power and competitive effects.128 Thus, while per
se illegality may cause some false positives, the tradeoffs are almost certainly
in favor of keeping the per se rule. Complex business practices often take a
great deal of resources and time to explain in court, which increases the level
of uncertainty and likelihood of errors. To the extent that legacy practices
that were implemented well before market power was achieved and are
ubiquitous within a market are generally procompetitive, having a
marginally procompetitive presumption has the potential to significantly
reduce administrative and legal costs without too much concern for perverse
incentive effects.
IV.

LEGACY CONDUCT IN RECENT ANTITRUST CASES

This Part examines a number of recent antitrust decisions that involve,
to one degree or another, determining the legality of various legacy business
practices. What emerges is that courts treat legacy issues somewhat
indiscriminately and often fail to explicitly relate market power with the
genesis of the practice (factor one). This indicates that a systematic
framework for assessing legacy and commonness could materially facilitate
a court’s determination of antitrust liability.
A. Ohio v. American Express
In Ohio v. American Express, the Supreme Court considered the
antitrust legality of Amex’s “anti-steering” policy, which prohibits
merchants from steering customers, at the point of sale, away from Amex to
other credit cards.129 For instance, suppose a customer at a high-end jewelry
shop selects just the right Omega Seamaster watch and pulls out her
American Express card. The merchant knows that he will have to pay a six
percent transaction fee to Amex and therefore prefers to “steer” the
cardholder to her Visa card, since the transaction fee will be something

128. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (“Agreements
which create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or
unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is
reasonable or unreasonable. . . .”).
129. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280 (2018)
If a merchant wants to accept Amex credit cards—and attract Amex cardholders
to its business—Amex requires the merchant to agree to an antisteering
contractual provision. The antisteering provision prohibits merchants from
discouraging customers from using their Amex card after they have already
entered the store and are about to buy something, thereby avoiding Amex’s fee.
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lower, say, four percent. This two percent differential will be split between
the merchant and cardholder in some manner (perhaps with the merchant
keeping most of the surplus). In order to prevent such behavior, Amex
requires merchants who wish to be part of the American Express network to
abide by its anti-steering provision.130
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s
decision and ruled that Amex’s anti-steering provision did not violate
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.131 Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence
Thomas observed that Amex had been using the same policy for over sixty
years: “Amex has prohibited steering since the 1950s by placing anti-steering
provisions in its contracts with merchants.”132 If we consider that Amex
entered the credit card market in 1958,133 the fact that the steering provisions
have been in place since the 1950s suggest that they were present since the
beginning. Before Amex’s entry, credit cards were a nascent industry
marked with some successes, such as the Diners Club, and many failures.134
It was not until 1958, when American Express, Bank of America, and Chase
Manhattan entered, that the industry achieved widespread profitability.135
At the time of the case, Amex’s market share was 26.4%.136 Visa,
MasterCard, and Discover had a forty-five percent, 23.3%, and 5.3% share,

130. Amex does not prevent merchants from steering cardholders to other payment
methods including cash, checks, or debit cards. See id. at 2283.
131. Id. at 2283 (“In October 2010, the United States and several States (collectively,
plaintiffs) sued Amex, claiming that its antisteering provisions violate § 1 of the Sherman
Act.”); id. at 2280 (“In this case, we must decide whether Amex’s antisteering provisions
violate federal antitrust law. We conclude they do not.”).
132. Id.
133. Our History, AMERICAN EXPRESS, https://about.americanexpress.com/our-history/
[https://perma.cc/M83N-K4K9] (last visited Oct. 6, 2021).
134. Timothy Wolters, “Carry Your Credit in Your Pocket”: The Early History of the
Credit Card at Bank of America and Chase Manhattan, 1 ENTER. & SOC’Y 315, 318–24
(2000).
135. Wolters summarizes the state of the early credit card industry:
Diners’ Club became a profitable enterprise and remained so until the late 1960s.
Commercial banks entered the charge card field in 1951. . . . Despite optimistic
performance predictions, however, many of these early charge card programs
suffered significant losses. . . . Such obstacles proved insurmountable for many
of the early credit card programs, and by 1957, only twenty-seven banks
continued to offer such plans to their customers. The following year, however,
management at the two largest banks in the United States concluded that they
could overcome these obstacles. . . . Those two banks were Chase Manhattan and
Bank of America.
Id. at 322, 324.
136. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2247, 2282 (2018).
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respectively.137 While Visa and MasterCard also implemented anti-steering
requirements for their merchants, they both entered into a consent decree
prior to the Amex decision.138 The practice, however, was not universal
given that Discover did not adopt such a policy.139 Of course, it is fairly easy
to understand why Discover had no interest in adopting an anti-steering
provision—Discover had some of the lowest swipe fees, so it stood to benefit
the most from merchant steering.140
While the Court found the legacy of Amex’s anti-steering practices
relevant enough to mention early in the decision, the Court never returned to
it. Perhaps Justice Thomas felt the weight of the economic and legal
evidence was sufficient to dismiss the anticompetitive claim without a need
to explore the implications of its longstanding use.
Yet, the legacy of the conduct mattered to Amex, which prominently
made note of it.141 Amex also, unsurprisingly, characterizes the legacy
practice as procompetitive.142 It is important to note, however, the
concession by Amex that it “strengthened these non-discrimination [antisteering] provisions in the 1990s following successful campaigns by Visa to
encourage merchant steering.”143 This is highly relevant. Any change that
strengthens the restrictions long associated with a business practice
significantly mitigates legacy defenses along the lines of “we’ve always done
this.” In effect, the legacy is “reset” if a business practice is made more
restrictive. While this does not completely negate the relevance of previous
legacy behavior, it puts a significant asterisk next to the defense, and courts
should rightly reset the legacy clock.
The Court never fully addressed whether Amex had substantial market

137. Id.
138. Id. at 2293 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2293–94 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(“Discover pursued its low-price strategy by pricing its network services ‘very aggressively
for merchants,’ setting all-in discount rates significantly below those of its competitors.”).
141. See Brief for Respondents at 1, Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 16–1454)
(“For decades, these nondiscrimination provisions [anti-steering provisions] have enabled
Amex to innovate and compete effectively against the dominant payment networks.”).
142. Id. at 5 (“Industry output has increased dramatically while Amex’s nondiscrimination
provisions have been in place.”).
143. Brief for Respondents at 10, Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 16–1454). This
change was also noted by the Second Circuit. See United States v. Am. Express, 838 F.3d
179, 191 (2d Cir. 2016) (“These restraints, known as non-discriminatory provisions (‘NDPs’),
had existed in Amex’s card-acceptance agreements in some form or another since the 1950s,
but Amex tightened them considerably in the late 1980s and early 1990s to ensure that
merchants could not state a preference for any payment-card network other than Amex.”).
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power, although the district court concluded that it did.144 Importantly,
would the Court have treated the conduct differently if Amex more clearly
had substantial market power—for example, if the case involved Visa rather
than Amex? We can see why Amex’s strategy was to allege that, with a
market share of less than thirty percent, it did not have market power. For
vertical restraints, the law is quite favorable to such businesses accused of
anticompetitive conduct,145 and the Court may have concluded—at least
implicitly—that Amex was legally blameless because it had too little market
power to cause harm, irrespective of Amex’s legacy conduct defense.
Overall, the Amex decision illustrates a number of relevant
considerations. First, both Amex and the Court prominently noted the legacy
of the conduct, although the Court did not pursue it further. Second, whether
a legacy practice has changed also matters. Finally, if it has not been proven
that a firm has market power, then there is no point in dwelling on legacy, as
arguments based on a lack of market power generally suffice to exonerate
the defendant. If the firm is found to have substantial market power,
however, or if it is unclear whether the firm possesses substantial market
power, then legacy can play a valuable role in determining whether the
conduct has contributed to the firm’s attractiveness and success in the
marketplace, rather than being inherently objectionable under the antitrust
laws.
B. FTC v. Qualcomm
Legacy also played a key role in Qualcomm.146 The facts are more
muddied, however, and the theory of harm is more multifaceted. The first
legacy issue is Qualcomm’s historic practice of licensing its standard
essential patents (SEPs) to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) of
mobile phones at a five percent royalty rate based off the price of the final

144. See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 151 (“American Express possesses sufficient
market power in the network services market to harm competition. . . .”).
145. See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898 (2007)
(stating that a vertical restraint “may not be a serious concern unless the relevant entity has
market power”); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 348 n.18 (1982)
(“[H]orizontal restraints are generally less defensible than vertical restraints.”).
146. FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2019).

2021]

THE LEGALITY OF LEGACY

281

device.147 Qualcomm engaged in this practice for three decades.148 The
second legacy issue is Qualcomm’s licensing policy regarding chipset
suppliers, who compete with Qualcomm in providing chipsets to handset
OEMs.149 Qualcomm maintained that it had not changed its practice of
licensing primarily to OEMs and only licensing to chipset suppliers if the
license did not exhaust the patent.150 Once the legal environment regarding
patent exhaustion changed, Qualcomm stopped licensing to chipset
suppliers.151 Qualcomm put a great deal of weight on the fact that it felt these
legacy practices were part of the reason why it grew its business and, more
generally, the mobile handset industry. Importantly, these practices were
instituted long before Qualcomm had market power in chipsets, which is the
market that the FTC alleged was the root of Qualcomm’s anticompetitive
behavior.152

147. See Opening Brief for Appellant Qualcomm at 14, Qualcomm, 969 F.3d 947 (No.
19–16122) (“By the time Qualcomm began selling chips, its model of licensing its technology
to OEMs on the basis of the entire cellphone was already well established. . . . Qualcomm
elected to maintain that model, and therefore sold its chips at prices that are independent of
the licensing fees.”). More specifically, Qualcomm explains:
Over time, Qualcomm’s licensing rates have been relatively stable . . . even as its
patent portfolio has exploded in size and breadth. . . . In 1991, Qualcomm began
licensing its full portfolio to OEMs, including SEPs and Non-SEPs, at around 5%
of the net selling price of licensed cellphones. . . . More recently, Qualcomm
established a 3.25% rate for a license to cellular SEPs only. . . . And, when
Qualcomm recently added its 5G patents to the scope of its SEP licenses, it chose
not to raise this rate despite the increased scope of the licensed technologies.
Id. at 16-17.
148. FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc. 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 783 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“A summary
exhibit collecting Qualcomm’s patent license agreements over the past 30 years shows that
Qualcomm has consistently charged OEMs a 5% running royalty for licenses to Qualcomm’s
patent portfolio. . . . Qualcomm charged Siemens a 5% running royalty in 1996 and charged
VIVO a 5% running royalty in 2015.”).
149. Chipsets, or “modem chipsets,” are essential components of mobile phones and allow
the phone to communicate with cellular networks. Qualcomm began its foray into chipsets
with the CDMA (“3G”) wireless standard and continued with the LTE (“4G”) standards.
Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 982.
150. Opening Brief for Appellant Qualcomm at 27, Qualcomm, 969 F.3d 947 (No. 19 –
16122) (“[Qualcomm] has always recovered the value of its intellectual property through
OEM licensing, while (as a result) its chip rivals have had only non-exhaustive access to its
SEPs.”).
151. Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 984 (“OEM-level licensing allows these companies to obtain
the maximum value for their patented technologies while avoiding the problem of patent
exhaustion, whereby ‘the initial authorized [or licensed] sale of a patented item terminates all
patent rights to that item.’ Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625, 128 S.
Ct. 2109, 170 L.Ed.2d 996 (2008).”).
152. FTC’s Complaint for Equitable Relief ¶ 86, Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (No.
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The challenge is that Qualcomm’s legacy arguments are not as clean as
those that Amex made for its anti-steering provisions and Apple can make
for the App Store. In effect, the FTC challenged whether these were legacy
practices at all. Before addressing these arguments in depth, it is worth
providing a little background on the case.
The case involves the interplay between two markets in which
Qualcomm competes. In the first market, Qualcomm manufacturers modem
chipsets. In parallel, Qualcomm develops technologies that it hopes will be
incorporated into various wireless communication standards set by standard
setting organizations (SSOs), also known as standard development
organizations (SDOs). SSOs can be thought of as matchmakers that bring
together innovators and implementors in order to reduce uncertainty and
thereby efficiently speed convergence towards a standard.153 SSOs
commonly declare certain patents as being essential to a given standard, and
these are labelled “standard essential patents” (SEPs). Before a standard is
adopted, and in order to get approval for the standard from the SSO, SEP
holders typically agree to license their SEPs on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms.154
The allegation made by the FTC was that Qualcomm violated its
commitment to license its SEPs on FRAND terms in two respects.155 First,
the FTC alleges that Qualcomm’s royalty rate to its OEM customers was

5:17-cv-00220) (“To maintain access to Qualcomm’s baseband processors, OEMs have
accepted royalty and other license terms that they would not otherwise accept.”); See also
Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 994 (noting that evidence of alleged anticompetitive behavior
occurred “in 1999, seven years before Qualcomm gained monopoly power”).
153. See Joanna Tsai & Joshua D. Wright, Standard Setting, Intellectual Property Rights,
and the Role of Antitrust in Regulating Incomplete Contracts, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 157, 183
(2015) (“SSOs . . . balance both sides of the market—that is, to attract contributors while
balancing the needs of adopters.”); see also Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, A Model for Forum
Shopping, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1091, 1092 (2006) (“Despite the copious research on standards,
little work has addressed the question of how SSOs should be organized or how firms should
choose between competing SSOs.”).
154. Much has been written regarding what “FRAND” precisely means. Ultimately, there
is a compelling argument that FRAND is purposely vague. See Tsai & Wright, supra note
151, at 183 (“[T]he available data constitute a prima facie case against the presumption
underlying some policy proposals that the incompleteness of SSO contracts represents market
failure in need of regulatory gap-filling or expanded antitrust enforcement.”). See generally
Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND)
Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2005)
(offering mechanisms to determine whether a royalty rate is “reasonable” and “nondiscriminatory”).
155. FTC’s Complaint for Equitable Relief at 2, Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (No.
5:17-cv-00220); FTC v. Qualcomm, Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC, Federal Trade
Commission’s Opposition to Qualcomm’s Motion to Dismiss, May 5, 2017.
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supra-FRAND.156 While the rate did stay the same in percentage terms, the
FTC contends that, due to changing features of mobile phones and the
composition of Qualcomm’s patent portfolio, “a 5% royalty on a 2006 phone
is not economically equivalent to a 5% royalty on a 2017 smartphone.”157
Second, the FTC claimed that Qualcomm’s refusal to license to its chipset
rivals, such as Intel and MediaTek, was a violation of its FRAND
obligation.158
Licensing SEPs to chipset suppliers is considered
“component-level” licensing—whereas licensing to OEMs is considered
“device-level” licensing.159
Importantly, the FTC also alleged that Qualcomm’s FRAND violations

156. FTC’s Complaint for Equitable Relief at 3, Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (No.
5:17-cv-00220)
Qualcomm’s ‘no license-no chips’ policy dramatically increases customers’ costs
of challenging Qualcomm’s preferred license terms before a court or other neutral
arbiter— including on the basis that those terms are non-FRAND—or to
negotiate royalties in the shadow of such a challenge. This leaves Qualcomm’s
customers in a markedly different position than they would be in a typical patent
licensing negotiation. As a result, Qualcomm’s customers have accepted elevated
royalties and other license terms that do not reflect an assessment of terms that a
court or other neutral arbiter would determine to be fair and reasonable.
FTC v. Qualcomm, Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC, Federal Trade Commission’s
Opposition to Qualcomm’s Motion to Dismiss, May 5, 2017, at 3 (“Qualcomm uses its
dominant position in the CDMA and premium LTE chip markets to distort license
negotiations and secure elevated non-FRAND royalties.”); FTC v. Qualcomm, Case No. 5:17cv-00220-LHK-NMC, Federal Trade Commission’s Opposition to Qualcomm’s Motion to
Dismiss, May 5, 2017, at 4 (“Qualcomm’s conduct has raised its royalties above FRAND
levels, so that the royalties incorporate an additional increment (or ‘tax’) reflecting
Qualcomm’s chip monopoly power.”).
157. FTC v. Qualcomm, Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC, Federal Trade
Commission’s Opposition to Qualcomm’s Motion to Dismiss, May 5, 2017, at 7 (“Moreover,
Qualcomm assumes that if its rate was ever FRAND, it must remain FRAND today because
it has not changed. But the complaint alleges that ‘handsets today offer a number of features’
not offered by older handsets, and ‘many of Qualcomm’s patents related to CDMA technology
have expired.’ (¶ 77.) Thus, a 5% royalty on a 2006 phone is not economically equivalent to
a 5% royalty on a 2017 smartphone.”).
158. FTC’s Complaint for Equitable Relief at 3, Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (No.
5:17-cv-00220) (“Qualcomm has consistently refused to license its cellular standard-essential
patents to its competitors, in violation of Qualcomm’s FRAND commitments.”); id. at 23 (“In
breach of its FRAND commitments, at odds with its recognition that other industry
participants ‘will require’ a license to its FRAND-encumbered SEPs, and in tension with its
practice of securing patent licenses for the benefit of its own customers, Qualcomm has
consistently refused to license its SEPs to competing suppliers of baseband processors.”).
159. FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc. 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 814 (“Licensing at the component level
refers to licensing to modem chip suppliers.”); id. at 755 (“To license at the ‘device level’
means to license the OEM, not the modem chip supplier.”).
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violated the antitrust laws.160 How? While the full description of this theory
of harm is fairly intricate, it largely amounts to a price squeeze.161 By
charging supra-FRAND rates on its SEPs to handset makers, in effect,
Qualcomm was squeezing the margins of chipset rivals because the elevated
licensing royalties to OEMs leave less money to pay for chipsets.162
The district court agreed with the FTC and ruled that Qualcomm
violated its FRAND commitment and, in doing so, also violated Section 2 of
the Sherman Act.163 The court focused on Qualcomm’s prior episodes of
licensing to chipset rivals.164 According to the court, Qualcomm had a prior
profitable course of dealing with chipset rivals and withdrew that based on
opportunism.165 Therefore, the court concluded that Qualcomm had a “duty
to deal” with its rivals under the doctrine established by the Supreme Court
in Aspen Skiing.166 The Ninth Circuit reversed this finding, stating it was
160. FTC v. Qualcomm, Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC, Federal Trade
Commission’s Opposition to Qualcomm’s Motion to Dismiss, May 5, 2017, at 17
(“Qualcomm’s Refusal to License Competitors on FRAND Terms Is Anticompetitive.”); id.
at 24–25
Qualcomm uses its monopoly power to make OEMs pay a royalty overcharge—
a tax—when buying modem chips from its competitors. Qualcomm further
hampers those competitors by denying them the licenses it promised would be
available on FRAND terms during standard setting. . . . Separately, those
allegations present a forceful antitrust case.
161. A price squeeze is an antitrust theory of liability that is based on a vertically integrated
firm (that is, a firm that has both upstream and downstream business units) (a) selling an input
to a downstream competitor at an elevated price and, concurrently, (b) lowering its own
downstream price in order to “squeeze” the margins of the downstream competitor. This
makes life considerably more difficult for the competitor and can result in hampering their
ability to compete on equal footing with the integrated firm in the downstream market. In a
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court rejected the price squeeze theory. See Pac. Bell Tel.
Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 449–52, 457 (2009).
162. See Lindsey M. Edwards, Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Section 2
Mangled: FTC v. Qualcomm on the Duty to Deal, Price Squeezes, and Exclusive Dealing, 8
J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 335, 337 (2019) (“[A] particularly troublesome error in the
district court’s opinion is the acceptance of a price squeeze theory directly contrary to the
Supreme Court’s holding in Pacific Bell Telephone Co v linkLine Communications, Inc.”).
163. FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 811 –12 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
164. Id. at 752 (“Qualcomm has previously licensed its modem chip SEPs to rivals and
received modem chip-level (as opposed to handset-level) licenses to other patent holders’
SEPs.”).
165. Id. at 753 (“Qualcomm stopped licensing rival modem chip suppliers not because
Qualcomm’s view of FRAND changed, but rather because Qualcomm determined that it was
far more lucrative to license only OEMs.”).
166. Id. at 762 (“Accordingly, with all three factors from Aspen Skiing met, the Court
concludes that Qualcomm has an antitrust duty to license its SEPs to rival modem chip
suppliers.”); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, (1985).
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inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s actual ruling on duty to deal in Aspen
Skiing and Trinko.167 Thus, the appellate court concluded that Qualcomm
had no obligation to license to chipset rivals.168 Further, Qualcomm’s patentlicensing royalties did not “impose an anticompetitive surcharge on rivals’
modem chip sales.”169 Rather, the appellate court painted a narrative of
frustration, both from OEMs and Qualcomm’s chipset rivals, at Qualcomm’s
success.170 Holding aside issues of a duty to deal, the district and appellate
courts treated the two legacy issues very differently.
First, regarding the five percent royalty rate, while the district court
acknowledged that the rate remained unchanged for over three decades, the
district court judge agreed with the FTC that the quality-adjusted royalty rate
had gone up rather than down due to the composition of Qualcomm’s
SEPs.171 The problem is that in order for this inquiry into the royalty rate to
be a relevant antitrust concern, the court must tie changes to the qualityadjusted royalty rate to Qualcomm’s market power in chipsets, which the
theory of harm requires.172 Absent this explicit tie, at best, Qualcomm
167. Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 994
The district court’s conclusion that Qualcomm’s refusal to provide exhaustive
SEP licenses to rival chip suppliers meets the Aspen Skiing exception ignores
critical differences between Qualcomm’s business practices and the conduct at
issue in Aspen Skiing, and it ignores the Supreme Court’s subsequent warning in
Trinko that the Aspen Skiing exception should be applied only in rare
circumstances. As a result, the FTC concedes error here. We agree.
168. Id. at 1005 (“Qualcomm’s practice of licensing its SEPs exclusively at the OEM level
does not amount to anticompetitive conduct in violation of § 2, as Qualcomm is under no
antitrust duty to license rival chip suppliers.”).
169. Id. (“Qualcomm’s patent-licensing royalties and ‘no license, no chips’ policy does
not impose an anticompetitive surcharge on rivals’ modem chip sales. Instead, these aspects
of Qualcomm’s business model are ‘chip-supplier neutral’ and do not undermine competition
in the relevant antitrust markets.”).
170. Id. at 985 (“Over the past several decades, as Qualcomm’s licensing and modem chip
businesses thrived and the company gained more and more market share, its OEM customers
and rival chipmakers grew frustrated with the company’s business practices.”).
171. Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 783 (“Moreover, even though Qualcomm’s share of
SEPs is declining and Qualcomm’s SEPs expire with successive standards, Qualcomm still
maintains a constant royalty rate.”); id. at 784 (“Qualcomm’s royalty rate should not stay
constant across standards when its patent portfolio has declined with successive standards.”).
172. The idea is that, if the elevated royalty rate is due to Qualcomm’s market power in
chipsets, then royalty rates should be lower in periods when Qualcomm did not have market
power in chipsets. This relationship between periods of market power and the royalty rate is
precisely what Qualcomm’s economic expert, Aviv Nevo, examined. Professor Aviv Nevo
tested the hypothesis that, during periods when Qualcomm was alleged to have market power
in chipsets, Qualcomm’s actual, contractual royalty rates were higher than rates outside these
periods. He concluded that the royalty rates did not increase with the advent of the CDMA
standard or the LTE standard (two big changes in licensing periods). Transcript of
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charged a higher real royalty over time, but there is no evidence the terms
were ever supra-FRAND or related to Qualcomm’s level of market power in
chipsets.173
The FTC also asserted that, even if Qualcomm’s percentage royalty rate
had not changed over time, the rate was supra-FRAND if we consider that
the features found on mobile phones have changed as well as the composition
of Qualcomm’s patent portfolio.174 Thus, the idea is that Qualcomm should
be receiving a lower royalty rate—not the same rate. Qualcomm responded
that the value of its SEPs has only increased over time as cellular standards
have changed and its portfolio has grown.175 Ultimately, discerning the
validity of these arguments from both the FTC and Qualcomm is quite
difficult. Nonetheless, the practice of charging a fixed royalty rate based off
a device’s price had not changed.
The lesson is that the crucial aspect of examining legacy practices is its
relationship to the market power that allegedly is fueling the theory of harm.
Consequently, assessing Qualcomm’s practices relative to its market power
in chipsets is the critical question. Moreover, the argument that the per
device royalty amount is increasing because the value of Qualcomm’s SEPs
has decreased is not a change in practice per se.176 As Qualcomm’s market
power in chipsets waxed and waned, the fact that there was no policy change
is highly relevant.
Second, regarding the practice of licensing to OEMs and only to chipset
Proceedings at 1865–75, Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (No. 5:17-cv-00220).
173. There is also a legitimate question of whether or not the quality of Qualcomm’s SEPs
declined over time. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, A Bargaining Model
v. Reality in FTC v. Qualcomm: A Reply to Kattan & Muris 4–5 (May 15, 2019), https://ss
rn.com/abstract=3389476 (noting internal Apple documents supported the view that
Qualcomm had, by far, the strongest set of patents).
174. FTC v. Qualcomm, Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC, Federal Trade
Commission’s Opposition to Qualcomm’s Motion to Dismiss, May 5, 2017, at 7.
175. See, e.g., FTC v. Qualcomm, Appellant’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File an
Enlarged Opening Brief, Aug. 23, 2019, at 88
The FTC offered no evidence that the value of Qualcomm’s patent portfolio is
declining. It is undisputed that Qualcomm’s licensed patent portfolio has grown,
not diminished, because new patents covering more technology areas are added
faster than old ones expire. Indeed, Qualcomm has added successive generations
of SEPs through 3G, 4G, and now 5G at no extra cost. The portfolio exhibits
approximately 30% compound annual growth, on net growing an average of 35
new patents per day—including patents fundamental to both newer generations
of cellular communication and key improvements.
176. That being said, the FTC’s theory of harm was dependent on an elevated royalty as a
violation of FRAND, which then allowed Qualcomm to squeeze the margin of rivals. Thus,
changing price/royalties has more relevance in this case than it would otherwise.
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suppliers if their patents are not exhausted, did Qualcomm change its practice
over time? On the surface, Qualcomm did move from granting a few
component-level licenses to granting none at all. On the other hand,
Qualcomm had always licensed primarily at the device-level and based its
royalties off a fixed percentage of the device price. Further, it only licensed
at the component-level to the extent that the license did not inhibit its ability
to license to device-level manufacturers. Once the patent law changed in a
way that inhibited this, Qualcomm was no longer willing to license to chipset
suppliers at the component-level. While this episode illustrates that legacy
inquiries require some level of factual weighing, the important point is
whether the change occurred before or after Qualcomm achieved market
power in chipsets and whether the change was causal with Qualcomm’s
chipset market power.
Qualcomm’s justification for licensing at the component-level only if it
did not exhaust its patents is a straightforward efficiency argument based on
transaction costs. Patent exhaustion would require Qualcomm to separate its
SEPs into chipset- and device-level technologies, which is inherently
difficult due to the interconnected nature of its intellectual property. Thus,
while Qualcomm conceded that its policies had “evolved,” it asserted that
the fundamental practice of licensing at the device-level remained
unchanged.177
Importantly, the appellate court noted that the only evidence cited by
the district court of component-level licensing was a license that occurred
years before Qualcomm obtained substantial market power in chipsets.178
Ultimately, the appellate court found that the “FTC offered no evidence that,
from the time Qualcomm first gained monopoly power in the modem chip
market in 2006 until now, it ever had a practice of providing exhaustive
licenses at the modem chip level rather than the OEM level.”179 Given that
177. Opening Brief for Appellant Qualcomm at 45, Qualcomm, 969 F.3d 947 (No. 1916122)
The precise mechanism by which rival chipmakers have had access to
Qualcomm’s SEPs has evolved. Early on, Qualcomm entered into nonexhaustive, royalty-bearing agreements with chipmakers that explicitly did not
grant rights to the chipmaker’s customers. . . . Qualcomm ceased doing so well
over a decade ago, in response to evolving court rulings addressing patent law’s
exhaustion doctrine, which indicated that any license inherently is exhaustive
regardless of any contractual provision to the contrary.
178. Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 994 (“In support of this finding, the district court cited a
single piece of record evidence: an email from a Qualcomm lawyer regarding 3%-royaltybearing licenses for modem chip suppliers. But this email was sent in 1999, seven years before
Qualcomm gained monopoly power in the CDMA modem chip market.”).
179. Id.
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the record indicates that Qualcomm instituted its policy regarding
component-level license well before achieving substantial market power, it
should be considered a legacy practice.
In addition to issues of legacy, the case also raised questions of
commonness, as both Ericsson and Nokia also licensed and set royalties only
at the device-level.180 Not surprisingly, Qualcomm invoked this fact as part
of its defense,181 and both the district and appellate courts addressed this
issue. The district court dismissed its ultimate value by noting that Nokia
and Ericsson also had market power due to their portfolio of SEPs.182 As a
general principal, the district court properly examined the market power of
rivals when assessing the universality of a practice within a market.
Unfortunately, the district court focused on power in the wrong market.
According to the theory of harm, the primary driver of Qualcomm’s ability
to deny component-level licenses and charge supra-FRAND rates to OEMs
was Qualcomm’s market power in chipsets—not SEPs. Neither Nokia nor
Ericsson competed with Qualcomm in the mobile chipset market.183 Thus,
if these two major industry players do not have the chipset monopoly that
Qualcomm allegedly had, then how can they still get away with violating
FRAND by insisting on device-level licensing? This is a major gap in the
district court’s reasoning.184 Further, if denying component-level licensing
is a FRAND violation, then why did chipset rivals, such as Intel and
MediaTek, not bring a FRAND case against Nokia and Ericsson for denying
180. Id. at 1003 (“Similarly here, companies like Nokia and Ericsson are now ‘[f]ollowing
Qualcomm’s lead’ with respect to OEM-level licensing. . . .”).
181. Opening Brief for Appellant Qualcomm at 13, Qualcomm, 969 F.3d 947 (No. 1916122) (“The inefficiencies and impracticality of such a ‘multi-level’ licensing scheme are so
serious that no major industry participant uses it. Every major cellular SEP licensor grants
exhaustive licenses to OEMs, not to chipmakers.”).
182. FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 754–55 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Following
Qualcomm’s lead, other SEP licensors like Nokia and Ericsson have concluded that licensing
only OEMs is more lucrative, and structured their practices accordingly.”); id. at 755 (“Nokia
and Ericsson’s contemporaneous documents and statements contradict Nokia’s and Ericsson’s
self-serving and made-for-litigation justifications for refusing to license modem chip
suppliers.”).
183. Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 983 (“Companies such as Nokia, Ericsson, and Interdigital
have comparable SEP portfolios but do not compete with Qualcomm in the modem chip
markets.”).
184. Specifically, according to the district court, Qualcomm’s market power in chipsets
allows it to charge supra-FRAND rates to handset makers. The ability to withhold those vital
chipsets from OEMs prevents these OEMs from challenging Qualcomm’s licenses as nonFRAND. See Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 698 (“ . . . Qualcomm wields its chip
monopoly power to coerce OEMs to sign patent license agreements. Specifically, Qualcomm
threatens to withhold OEMs’ chip supply until OEMs sign patent license agreements on
Qualcomm’s preferred terms.”).
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them a license? Neither Nokia nor Ericsson have chipsets like Qualcomm
that could be used to squeeze rivals and leverage supra-FRAND rates.
Ultimately, the record indicates that device-level licensing is a common
industry practice, and the appellate court properly placed significant weight
on that fact.185
In sum, while Qualcomm represents one of the most complex antitrust
cases in recent memory, the role of legacy and commonness mattered a great
deal and provided a “North Star” to the appellate court. The district court
clearly saw things quite differently, and what seemed to be missing was a
systematic approach to the question of how to consider legacy and common
practices—particularly how they relate to the relevant market power.
C. Compromised Legacies
Thus far, our primary focus has been on cases involving unilateral
conduct—given that this is where legacy considerations are typically the
most relevant. Yet, looking to cases involving cooperation across firms can
also be illustrative as it can show how concerted action can provide even
newly formed entities market power. In a nutshell, longstanding and
common practices should be viewed with a different lens when examining
potential Section 1 violations involving coordination.186
Conduct with a long history does not necessarily qualify as a legacy
practice, as the practice must be established before achieving substantial
market power.187 Thus, even in situations where a practice is implemented
at the time of entry, if that entry is “compromised,” such as coupling the
entry with coordination among competitors, then entry and market power are
coincident. If so, then a long history tells us very little in regard to the
likelihood that the practice is procompetitive.
One example of a compromised legacy is Broadcast Music v. Columbia
Broadcast System.188 The case is perhaps best known for the ruling that

185. Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 984 (“Qualcomm licenses its patent portfolios exclusively at
the OEM level, setting the royalty rates on its CDMA and LTE patent portfolios as a
percentage of the end-product sales price. This practice is not unique to Qualcomm.”); id. at
996 (“Qualcomm’s reasonable, procompetitive justification that licensing at the OEM and
chip-supplier levels simultaneously would require the company to engage in ‘multilevel
licensing,’ leading to inefficiencies and less profit. Qualcomm’s procompetitive justification
is supported by at least two other companies—Nokia and Dolby—with similar SEP portfolios
to Qualcomm’s.”).
186. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 198 (2010) (“[A] history of
concerted activity does not immunize conduct from § 1 scrutiny.”).
187. See supra Section II.A.
188. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., Inc., 444 U.S. 1 (1979).
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music licensing collectives that negotiate a “blanket license” on behalf of its
member artists should not be condemned as a per se illegal price fixing
scheme under Section 1.189 Specifically, in 1914 and 1939, the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast
Music, Inc. (BMI), respectively, formed as agencies to facilitate the licensing
of music for its members to economize on transaction costs.190 The
formation of these licensing collectives in the early 20th century was almost
immediately challenged as anticompetitive by the DOJ.191 ASCAP and BMI
only survived after a series of consent decrees designed to minimize the
potentially harmful effects of these collectives,192 while preserving their
ability to save on transaction costs when licensing music. In evaluating the
legality of blanket licenses after the CBS complaint, despite their long
history and ubiquity in music licensing, the Supreme Court properly afforded
no procompetitive prior to ASCAP’s and BMI’s practices. The collective
action behind the formation of both cooperatives surely gave them
substantial market power. Thus, blanket licenses were never a legacy
practice in the first place, as defined in this Article.
A parallel can be found in National Football League v. Ninth Inning.193
The case involves the question of whether the NFL’s Sunday Ticket Package
sold exclusively through the satellite TV provider DirecTV is a violation of

189. Id. at 23–25. Blanket licenses give a licensee the right to publicly perform any or all
of the portfolio of music owned by the members of the collective. See, e.g., Andrew I. Gavil,
Burden of Proof in U.S. Antitrust Law, in 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 125, 139
(ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008)
[T]he Court’s decisions in BMI and Sylvania . . . introduced important core
conceptual content to the rule of reason. . . . Sylvania and BMI together
appeared to mandate consideration of efficiencies. In fact, the Court concluded
in BMI that the presence of plausible efficiencies—cost reducing and output
expanding tendencies—could justify moving a case out from under the per se
label.
190. See Broadcast Music, Inc.444 U.S. at 5 (“[A]s a practical matter it was impossible
for the many individual copyright owners to negotiate with an license the users and to detect
authorized uses.”).
191. Id. at 10 (“In separate complaints in 1941, the United States charged that the blanket
license . . . was an illegal restraint of trade. . . .”).
192. Id. at 11 (“The case was settled by a consent decree that imposed tight restrictions on
ASCAP’s operations.”). See also Stephen Calkins, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., in ANTITRUST STORIES 205, 213 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A.
Crane eds., 2007) (“Among other provisions, the 1941 ASCAP decree prevented ASCAP
from receiving exclusive rights to compositions, prevented discrimination, and required
ASCAP to offer a ‘per-program’ license (in addition to its customary blanket license which
conveyed rights to all of ASCAP’s music for all programs).”).
193. NFL v. Ninth Inning, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 56 (2020).
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Section 1 based on a conspiracy among the thirty-two NFL teams to jointly
sell the broadcast rights to their games.194 As the Supreme Court pointed out
in their decision denying certiorari (for now), the DirecTV contract has been
in place for twenty-six years,195 as the agreement goes back to 1994.196 In
this case, legacy offers no real information value as the legal question is not
whether market power changes a previously procompetitive practice to one
that is anticompetitive, but rather whether the initial agreement, whether in
place twenty-six years or twenty-six days, is a “contract, combination, or
conspiracy” in violation of Section 1.
Finally, in a case that came before Judge Richard Posner, In re Brand
Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, the primary issue was
whether a “chargeback” system implemented by wholesalers of prescription
drugs was a conspiracy with drug manufacturers to fix prices to the detriment
of retail drug stores.197 Alternatively, was the system part of scheme to
prevent arbitrage from price discrimination, in which case, the conduct
would be competitively neutral? Notably, this “chargeback” system had
been adopted decades earlier in the early 1980s.198 Based at least marginally
on legacy considerations, Judge Posner determined that the scheme was
merely part of a price discrimination mechanism.199 This case is somewhat
distinguishable from Amex and Qualcomm in that assessing legacy was used
to demonstrate a practice was competitively neutral (that is, as part of a price
discrimination scheme) rather than procompetitive.
CONCLUSION
Courts operate under limited information. They gather evidence on

194. Id. at 57
Under the existing contract, the 32 NFL teams have authorized the NFL to sell
the television rights for out-of-market games to a single buyer, DirecTV. The
plaintiffs argue, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that antitrust law may require
each team to negotiate an individualized contract for televising only its own
games.
195. Id. at 56 (“In this antitrust case, the plaintiffs challenged the National Football
League’s contract with DirecTV for the television rights to out-of-market games. That
contract has been in place for 26 years.”).
196. Babette Boliek, Antitrust, Regulation, and the “New” Rules of Sports Telecasts, 65
HASTINGS L.J. 501, 541 (2014).
197. 288 F.3d 1028, 1029–30 (7th Cir. 2002).
198. Id. at 1030.
199. Id. at 1034 (given that “the chargeback system was adopted before the alleged
collusion of the manufacturers began,” inferring that the wholesalers knowingly engaged in a
collusive scheme “would be particularly shaky here”).
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markets and are asked to delineate relevant antitrust markets; assess the
degree of antitrust market power that firms enjoy; assess the competitive
effects; determine whether entry and exit impact the analysis; and to assess
the degree to which efficiencies should be considered. This is a heavy
burden.200 That being said, the fact that cases are complicated and difficult
is not an indictment of antitrust. Understanding business practices is a
complex undertaking, and firms deserve a fair review. It is more important
to properly decide a case than it is to quickly administer decisions and have
unacceptably high error costs. Nevertheless, there is a balance. Antitrust
should look for opportunities to reduce administrative and litigation costs
without compromising accuracy. This Article argues that legacy and
common conduct can help to serve that function in certain circumstances.

200. See, e.g., Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for
Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals,
54 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2011).

